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Preface
This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Seventh Railway
Project for which Loan 1836-KO was approved in April 1980 for the sum of
US$94.0 million.
The PCR was prepared by the East Asia and Pacific Transportation I
Division, based upon a review of the project files and data supplied in August
1984 by the Korean National Railways. Bank staff who worked on the project
have also been interviewed.
The loan clo;ing date was December 31, 1984.
In accordance with the revised project performance reporting
procedures this report has been read in the Operations Evaluation Department
(OED) but the project was not audited by OED staff. The draft Completion
Report was sent to the Borrower for comments. Comments received are shown
as an annex to the report.
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Highlights
i. The Seventh Railway Project continued the Bank's assistance to the
Government of Korea in improving its transportation network. The project was
designed to meet increasing passenger and freight transport volumes and also
to strengthen the Korean National Railways (KNR) as an institution and prepare
it for full autonomy by January 1, 1987.
ii. The project achieved most of its objectives despite several delays
and reductions in the investment plan. KNR successfully and efficiently
executed all civil works. The commercial accounting, costing, marketing and
management information systems implemented under the project had a significant
effect on KUR as an institution. These were not the only institution building
achievements, since a start was made under the project on introducing a man-
agement improvement program. In addition, extensive urban, regional and
corridor multimodal transport studies have led to significant improvements in
transport planning in Korea as well as the identification of viable new
investment opportunities. Finally, due to lower than expected traffic growth
and government tariff policies, the economic and financial returns were not as
high as expected.
iii. The outstanding feature of this project is its extensive institution
building and the development of a more market-oriented KNR. Also, the land-
mark transport studies carried out mainly by local consultants in joint
ventures with foreign firms have significantly helped to build Korean consult-
ing firms and introduce a multimodal approach to transport planning.
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I. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND SECTORAL SETTING
The Transport Sector
1.01 Korea's export-led industrialization has been among the most
successful examples of economic development in recent history. During
1962-78, real GNP grew by 10% p.a. and per capita income more than tripled in
real terms. Coupled with industrialization and urbanization, major develop-
ments and changes in the transportation sector complemented and supported the
transfotmation of Korea's economy. Passenger traffic tripled between 1964 and
1971 and then tripled again by 1981; freight traffic increased nine times and
five times during the respective periods.
1.02 The Government of Korea's (GOK) basic transport planning objective
in the past has been to increase transport capacity in line with projected
traffic growth and to avoid major bottlenecks. This objective has been
largely achieved. Furthermore, the transport system as developed is
reasonably balanced, as there is no substantial uneconomic allocation of
traffic among the various modes.
1.03 Large investments in transportation infrastructure have been comple-
mented by a considerable effort to improve the efficiency of the transporta-
tion system through the establishment and strengthening of institutions to
plan, construct, maintain and operate the facilities ant services. This is
true both in the public sector, with the establishing and strengthening of
institutions such as the Korean National Railways (KNR) or the Transport
Coordination Bureau (TCB) in the Ministry of Transport, and in the private
sector by the successful development of many contractors capable of handling a
wide range of public works in Korea and abroad.
1.04 The Bank has played an active role in advising and assisting the
Korean authorities in pursuing their transport objectives. A summary of
investments follows.
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Signing Loan/ Amount
Date Credit (US$ million)
1. Railways I 8/17/62 C-25 14.0
2. Railways II 12/18/67 C-llO 11.0
3. Railways III 5/14/70 C-183 15.0
L-669 40.0
4. Railways IV 11/22/72 L-863 40.0
5. Railways V 4/10/75 L-1101 100.0
6. Railways VI 4/10/78 L-1542 120.0
7. Railways VII 5/21/80 L-1836 94.0
Subtotal 434.0
8. Coal & Cement
Distribution 4/29/83 L-2267 122.0
9. Ports I 6/27/73 L-917 80.0
10. Ports II 4/28/77 L-1401 67.0
Subtotal 147.0
11. Grant for Transpor-
tation Survey 9/13/65 0.2
12. Highway & Transpor-
tation Coordina-
tion Surveys 7/24/68 C-S4 3.5
13. Highways I 6/29/71 L-769 54.5
14. Highways II 1/25/74 L-956 47.0
15. Highways III 2/20/76 L-1203 90.0
16. Highways IV 12/22/78 L-1640 143.0
17. Provincial &
County Roads 12/30/82 L-2228 125.0
18. Highway Sector Loan 3/22/84 L-2392 230.0
Subtotal 693.2
Total 1,396.2
The Railway Subsector
1.05 With the modernization of its network which was assisted by the Bank
through seven projects, the KNR remains the most economic means of land
transport for moving bulk traffic over medium and long distances. KNR now
operates a well maintained 3,100 route-km network of standard gauge including
610 km of double track and 47 km of narrow gauge. About 370 km of single
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track industrial lines serving the northeast coal and cement producing areas
are electrified, as well as about 100 km of the Seoul Metropolitan Electric
Suburban Railway System (SMESRS) linking Incheon and Suweon. Staff comprises
38,000 people, with 33,500 permanent employees. Productivity is high in terms
of traffic units (pass-km plus net ton-km), and was 847,000 per staff member
in 1983 compared to 500,000 for European railways; dense urban and intercity
passenger traffic and heavy bulk commodity traffic contribute to this.
1.06 KKR's freight traffic is substantial and concentrAted on a few bulk
commodities. In 1983, it carried 50.3 million tons of freight, an 8% increase
p.a. since 1966, on a 1,222 km average distance, amounting to 11.2 billion
ton-km. Traffic exceeded 14 million tons on the most heavily used section of
the northeast industrial line (Taebaek). The next heaviest used sections, the
Jung-Ang line south of Jecheon and the Seoul-Busan line, carry around 4 mil-
lion tons annually. The main commodities transported include coal with 20.8
million tons p.a. which doubled sinze 1966, and cement with 11.1 million tons
p.a., quadrupling since 1966. In addition, other bulk commodities (ore, oil,
fertilizer, and grain) accounted for 78X of KNR's total freight ton-km in
1983, up from 66% in 1966.
1.07 KN's main revenues come from passenger traffic but competition with
road transport is severe. The opening of the Seoul-Busan and Daejon-Gwangju
expressways in 1970-73 marked the beginning of intense road competition by
long-distance bus transport. The rise in personal incomes increased people's
mobility, and their demand for greater comfort resulted in a shift to higher
class trains. Also, with the opening in 1974 of KNR's electrified suburban
lines connected to the first Seoul subway line, a new era of rapid transit
started. After a serious decrease in the early 1970s, passenger traffic grew
at a rate of 7% p.a. from 1975 to 1980, but has since leveled off. The
proportion of passengers riding lower class (ordinary) trains has declined to
35%, with the balance riding limited express and special express trains which
increased over five-fold since 1972. In 1983, 136 million long-distance
passengers were transported; passenger traffic on the SMESRS also grew
rapidly, exceeding 315 million passengers that year. These trends indicate
the areas in which KNR should increase its services.
1.08 Operating efficiency remains high and in general continues to
improve. KNR earned positive returns until 1971; its financial situation then
deteriorated as inflation increased costs faster than tariffs and required
annual government subsidies. Historically, tariffs for freight and ordinary
passenger trains were much below costs and were cross-subsidized by the
profitable long distance passenger services. However, covenants in successive
Bank railway projects emphasized the need to increase freight tariffs in real
terms which were raised by over 150% between 1975 and 1983 despite rapid
inflation. Freight revenues now cover total costs excluding debt service.
Also, since 1978 passenger fares have been raised somewhat faster than the
cost of living, with the exception of fares for ordinary trains which KNR
intends to raise gradually.
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II. PROJECT FORMULATION
2.01 The project was identified by the Korean Government a.d prepared
with the assistance of consultants financed under the Sixth Railvay Project.
The project directly focussed on the goals for Bank participation in the
transport sector set jointly by the Bank with the Korean Government, namely to
increase capacity of the transport system in the most economically efficient
way and to develop and strengthen the institutions dealing with the transport
sector.
2.02 During the mid-1970s in Korea, the combination of increasing incomes
and Government's policy of restricting the ownership and use of private
automobiles led to sharply increasing demand for express train services, with
the number of passengers transported on these trains increasing fivefold
between 1974 and 1979. The Seventh Railway Project therefore offered an
opportunity to the Bank to support two key Government policies: (a) to
discourage the use of private automobiles by improving public transport; and
(b) to concentrate the country's physical development around five cities:
Daejon, Daegu, Masan, Gwangju and Jeonju, by improving passenger transport to
these cities from Seoul and Busan. There were also energy saving considera-
tions which were important at what was then a period of recurrent oil
crises. With their high occupancy, passenger trains consume less fuel per
passenger-km than expressway buses on long distance routes such as Seoul-
Busan, and the Government wanted to promote energy conservation.
2.03 The project appraisal mission, composed of an engineer, an economist
and a financial analyst, visited Korea in September 1979 and reviewed the
project documents. These included the investment plan, economic evaluation,
engineering plans, bid documents, traffic data and other information requested
by the Bank and prepared by KNR. The project essentially consisted of (a) the
investments which KNR planned for 1980-82; and (b) technical assistance for
implementation of management reforms as well as for transport and urban
transport feasibility studies.
2.04 Major issues raised at appraisal were:
(a) Doubling of the Chung Bug Line. Section 3.12 of Loan Agreement
1542-KO (Sixth Railway Project: KNR's 1978-79 Investment Plan)
provided that "the Borrower shall take or cause to be taken all
action necessary to ensure that substantial changes in KNR's
Investment Plan shall only be made with the concurrence of the
Bank," substantial changes meaning an increase or a decrease of more
than W 10 billion. Despite this convenant the Government undertook
in 1978 and 1979 several investments exceeding W 10 billion without
Bank concurrence. Most of these investments were technically and
economically justified and the Bank agreed to add them to the
original plan. The only investment to which the Bank objected was
the double tracking of the entire Chung Bug Line (113 km) instead of
the 8.6 km section for which double tracking was originally
envisaged. In its letter of September 4, 1979 the Bank suggested
that the Government, which undertook these works for political and
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military reasons, should not include them in KUR's 1978-79
Investment Plan but rather consider them as a "special line" to be
operated by KKR. This impLied that the Government would itself
finance the double tracking of the additional 104.4 km and provide
KNR with subsidies as necessary to make up for any loss KNR would
suffer as a result of operating the line. The Government agreed to
follow up on the Bank's suggestion, and the appraisal mission
recommended that confirmation of the Government's plans on the
financing of this investment should be a condition of loan
negotiations.
(b) Loan Amount. The loan was to finance part of the project's foreign-
exchange expenditure (estimated at US$167 million). KNR requested
to raise the loan amount to US$100 million - as opposed to the US$75
million then earmarked in the Lending Program. The mission noted
that KNR was probably not capable of raising money directly frona
foreign commercial sources because (i) it had not yet acquired
corporate status and (ii) it functioned as a government department
and depended for its financial viability on an annual budgetary
grant. Even with a loan amount increased to US$100 million, the
Bank's contribution to total project cost would still be propor-
tionally lowe: than in past railway loans to Korea. A US$100
million loan would represent roughly 15Z of the cost of the seventh
project while the US$120 million Bank loan for the Sixth Railway
Project financed about 30% of the corresponding total project
cost. The mission recommended that the loan amount be raised to
approximately US$100 million.
(c) KNR's Organization and Management. Under Section 3.08 of Loan
Agreement 1542-KO the Government had agreed on the execution of a
management study as part of the Sixth Railway Project and on
implementation of the study's recommendations "as shall be agreed
with the Bank." The study was completed and the appraisal mission
had the opportunity to review it and to discuss its major recommen-
dations with KNR, the Ministry of Transport and the Economic
Planning Board (EPB). The study's main conclusion was that KNR
should be gradually transformed from its present status as a semi-
autonomous government agency to that of a public corporation. KNR's
managerial functions should be delegated to three deputy administra-
tors respectively in charge of Planning, Coordination and Control;
Operations; and Administration. Short-term measures would focus on
the establishment of a management information system and a marketing
organization within KNR. The latter's main function would be to
conceive and carry out an aggressive marketing policy with immediate
action toward obtaining a higher share of Korea's long distance
container traffic for which the railway has an economic advantage.
Mid-term action would aim at strengthening KNR's capability in the
fields of planning, -aainly economic analysis of investment planning,
and of financial management and accounting procedures with special
emphasis on introduction of performance budgeting, backshop
accounting and incremental long-term variable costing. The mission
recommended that the Government be asked to prepare a draft time-
phased plan for implementing the measures suggested by the study.
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(d) Tariffs. The mission noted that in recent years the Government
increased KNR's tariffs several times in order to meet or at least
approach financial objectives agreed with the Bank. However,
freight rates were generally raised across the board rather than
cost based. KNR's tariff structure needed to be revised to ensure
that passenger and freight rates will be at least equal to the
variable costs incurred by KNR, but not higher than comparable
competitor's tariffs or KNR's total costs including a reasonable
rate of return on investments. The mission recommended that the
Government and KNR propose and finalize during negotiations, a time-
phased plan for implementing a new cost-based tariff structure.
(e) Sector Studies. The comprehensive transport study then being done
by Korean consultants (KIST) under the Sixth Railway Project was to
be available in June 1980; it would give a general indication of
investments needed in the transport sector. One of the likely major
issues concerned ways and means to increase transport capacity in
the Seoul-Busan corridor; one possibility being considered was a
high speed railway line. The mission recommended that following up
on the KIST study, a more detailed analysis of possible alternatives
should be made and that such a study be financed by the project.
Another related issue concerned the proper planning and design of
the large transport investments under way or planned in the Seoul
metropolitan area and possibly soon in the Busan metropolitan
area. It had become necessary that proper urban transport studies
be made of the two metropolitan areas and not just of the special
cities, as was done in the past. The mission felt that agreement
should also be reached on these studies at negotiations.
2.05 Loan negotiations were held in Washington from March 17 to March 21,
1980 and the above issues were discussed. On the Chung Bug line, Government
proposals to fully reimburse KNR for the capital cost (about $14.0 million)
over a 2-3 year period were accepted. On project cost, the Bank agreed, in
view of substantial oil price increases in 1979 and revisions to the GOK's
foreign borrowing plans, to increase the loan amount by US$15.0 million plus
an additional US$4 million to finance transport studies; these additions
brought the loan amount to US$94.0 million. On organization it was agreed
that KNR should be converted from a government entity to a fully autonomous
corporation no later than January 1, 1987. Also, a series of short- and
medium-term managerial measures together with timetables for their implemen-
tation were agreed upon and included in a Supplemental Letter to the Loan
Agreement. On tariffs, it was agreed to set them at a sufficiently high level
to ensure that KNR's revenues meet its operating expenditures, debt service
obligations and a reasonable proportion of capital costs.
2.06 The project as finally agreed at negotiations had the following
major components:
(a) completion of the quadrupling of the 32.3 km section Seoul-Suweon;
(b) expansion of the West Seoul freight terminal at Susaeg;
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(c) installation of a centralized traffic control system (CTC) on about
270 km of lines;
(d) rail or track renewal on about 320 km and provision of 70,000
concrete sleepers and 70,000 cu m of ballast;
(e) bridge and tunnel strengthening and right-of-way improvemtents;
(f) separation of road and rail at level crossings;
(g) provision of track maintenance equipment and track material workshop
machinery;
(h) the acquisition of 10 main-Iiue diesel locomotives, 12 diesel and 16
electric railcars for intercity traffic, 130 electric railcars for
Seoul urban traffic, 246 passenger cars and 100 freight cars and
repowering of 40 diesel locomotives and 40 diesel railcars;
i) provision of subsidiary shops for the new Daejeon passenger and
freight car shop and improvements to existing workshops and sheds;
(j) improvement of telecommunications and power facilities;
(k) construction of housing for emplcyees and provision of hospital
equipment; and
(1) provision of training, technical assistance for implementation of
the recommendations of the management study carried out under the
Fifth and Sixth Projects, and feasibility studies for transport
sector investments selected upon completion of the national
transport study being carried out under the Sixth Railway Project.
2.07 The loan was approved by the Board on April 29, 1980, the Loan
Agreement was signed on May 21, 1980 and became effective on August 29,
1980. The conditions of effectiveness included the execution of a Subsidiary
Loan Agreement between the Government and KNR whereby US$88.2 million of the
Bank loan was onlent at similar terms and conditions as between the Bank and
the Government. The Bank loan carried a term of 17 years including 4 years of
grace at 8.25Z per annum.
2.08 The total foreign exchange component was estimated at US$160 million
equivalent. The Bank loan of US$94 million would cover the costs of about
33,800 tons of rail, track maintenance equipment, 2 breakdown cranes, 246
passenger cars, 100 freight cars, workshop equipment, technical assistance and
training. The remainder of the foreign expenditures was to be met through
borrowing from other sources. About US$8.0 million were to be provided by the
U.S. Export-Import Bank and US commercial banks, mainly for diesel engines, at
an interest rate of 9% repayable over 9 years; about US$38.0 million was
expected to be obtained from a foreign source, possibly with the involvement
of a national export credit guarantee agency, for signalling equipment; about
US$5.0 million for hospital equipment was to be provided through a loan from
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the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF); a further US$15.8
million would be provided by the Korea Exchange Bank at an interest rate of
7.5% repayable over 20 years.
III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS
Overview
3.01 In 1980 both passenger and freight traffic were slightly below their
respective 1979 levels, with passenger traffic reaching only 87% and freight
traffic 96Z of appraisal projections. The Korean economy was suffering a
downturn and accordingly several capital investment programs were scaled down
in early 1981, including that of the railways. The railway plan reductions
were in items not financed by the Bank, and total project cost declined from
the appraisal estimates of US$604 million to US$367 million. Due to overall
budgetary constraints at that time, project implementation was initially slow
but once underway it was implemented efficiently. Most civil works were
completed with minimal delays, but the loan closing date was postponed by one
year to December 31, 1984 mainly to allow completion of the multi-modal
transport studies. KNR was the executing agency for all project works.
Civil Engineering Works
3.02 Following the downturn in traffic and the generally poor economic
climate, KRR with Bank support decided to cut back its investment plan in
early 1981 by deferring some items and reducing the quantities for others.
Accordingly the following items were deferred to the 1982-86 investment plan:
1981 Cost (Won billion)
Industrial sidings (POSCO and Gwangyang) 10.84
By-pass line, Jecheon 1.68
Freight terminal, West Seoul 10.29
CTC, Yeongju-Gyeongju (163.5 km) 32.79
CTC, Jecheon - Baegsan (106.7 km) 21.32
Tokenless block signalling 1.78
Other items 1.46
Total 80.16
Also, major quantity reductions were made for the following items:
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Cost Reduction
Quantity Reduction (1981 won billion)
From To Index From To Index
Station installations - - 80 9.54 6.99 73
Track renewal 110 km 65 km 59 10.78 8.68 80
New electric railcars for SMESRS 130 88 68 58.71 36.41 62
Railcars for long distance 28 20 71 7.61 7.09 93
Improvement of existing work-
shops and sheds - - 30 8.44 2.78 33
Housing and hospitals - - 70 7.85 5.76 73
As a result of these measures the total project cost estimate was reduced to
W 239 billion or 32% below the appraisal estimate.
3.03 In addition, there was one new item when the Government for
political reasons decided to double track the 101 km Iri-Songjeongri section
of the Ho Nam line. Construction started in February 1981 and should be
completed by mid-1985. The total cost was estimated at W 152 billion (about
US$234 million) of which about W 9 billion were spent in 1981. Since the
amount spent during the 1977-81 investment plan period was less than W 20
billion, the Government's decision was not interpreted as a violation of
section 4.06 of the Loan Agreement.
3.04 All of these rearrangements made project implementation initially
slow. However, once underway the project works were efficiently executed and
essentially completed by late 1983. KNR demonstrated an excellent implementa-
tion capability.
Procurement
3.05 Procurement was handled by the Office of Supply (OSROK). Most items
were procured through international competitive bidding with Korean suppliers
winning many of the contracts. Some items were procured on schedule, e.g.,
contracts for the rails and breakdown cranes but there were some delays in
others, e.g., the freight cars. As a whole, delays were due primarily to
planned slowdowns in the investment plan; there were no significant problems
with the conduct of the procurement process itself. Table 3.1 has details for
all items procured.
3.06 The only Bank/Borrower procurement controversy revolved around the
purchase of 2,052 tons of special heat-treated rails from a Korean supplier
who was the lowest evaluated bidder. The Bank was concerned since KNR had in
September 1983 requested an extension of the loan closing date because, among
other reasons, they needed to perform a seven-month test of the Korean
supplier's heat-treated rails before they could place an order. The Bank felt
that the supplier may have been technically unqualified and withheld approval
of the bid until a mission could fully investigate all available evider:e.
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3.07 Accordingly, all documents were reviewed during the December 1983
mission to Korea. It was found that the said Korean manufacturer had been
producing rails for more than six years. Its domestic customers included KNR,
the Seoul and Busan metropolitan rail systems and several coal mines. KNR was
satisfied with the rails it had received from this supplier in the past.
Heat-treated steel for the rails in question was manufactured under a
licensing arrangement from a large U.S. company, and the Korean manufacturer
was apparently using similar technology to manufacture specialty steels for
other users in Korea as well as for export to the U.S. Although the Korean
manufacturer could produce only 15 m lengths of heat-treated steel rails, it
was already planning to expand facilities to handle the 25-m long rail that
KNR needed. All other technical specifications, e.g., hardness distribution,
tension, bending drop, chemical composition, etc., were satisfactory. The
mission therefore recommended approval of the contract with the Korean
supplier which was done in early 1984.
Feasibility Studies
3.08 Several major studies were financed under the Railways VII loan.
They were mostly intermodal and covered urban, regional and intercity
transport. A brief description of studies under each category follows.
Urban Transport
3.09 Seoul City Transport Improvement Program Feasibility Study. The
basic objectives of the study were to (a) assist the city government in estab-
lishing effective traffic management and traffic planning units; and (b) to
develop traffic management, pedestrian facilities and road construction pro-
grams to relieve traffic congestion in the city. A team of American consul-
tants with Korean partners was selected to conduct this 12-month study and
contracts were signed in April 1982. The study was well executed and the
final report was issued in September 1983. Its recommendations formed the
basis for the current Seoul urban transport project which will try to complete
major missing links in the Seoul road netork and introduce Transport System
Management (TSM). TSM mostly includes the application of low-cost improve-
ments to streets in major corridors which will significantly enhance capacity.
3.10 Busan City Transport Improvement Program Feasibility Study. This
study had objectives similar to the Seoul study and was carried out by mostly
Korean teams with selected foreign specialists. It was completed in August
1984 and its recommendations formed the basis of the Busan urban transport
project which is about to be preappraised. The project will mostly focus on
locating terminals and other improvements to public transit as well as use of
the TSM concept.
3.11 Public Transport Operations Study * The study's objectives were to
further develop Ministry of Transport (MOT) capabilities in evaluating
transport policies, regulations on public transport and in setting fare
structures, route assignments and licensing. The study was conducted by
Korean consultants, took about eight months and was completed in August
1984. The study analyzed the problems Seoul City has experienced with public
transit in certain arterial roads and also difficulties in bus/subway
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interchange. In its recommendations the study suggested improvements to
regulatory systems, particularly for buses and taxis. These findings form the
basis for current Bank/MOT dialogue on regulation and fare setting for the 90
odd bus companies in Seoul (which are all privately operated and profit-
able). Some of the study's routing and fare setting recommendations are
currently being implemented while others will proabably be components of the
proposed second Seoul urban transport project.
3.11 Training Requirements in Transport Planning. The objectives of the
study were to (a) identify types of training needed for urban transportation
personnel (both in traffic management and transport planning); and (b) develop
the organizational plan and personnel qualifications needed to carry out the
training. The nine-month study was conducted by a Korean consulting team
assisted by Seoul National University and was completed in September 1984.
The study suggested establishing a national training institute for transporta-
tion personnel and outlined a syllabus for transport courses that should be
offered as well as proposals for a research program. Current Bank/MOT
discussions are exploring the possibility of implementing these findings.
3.12 Secondary Cities Transport Improvement Program. The study had
objectives similar to those of the Seoul and Busan studies, but as applied to
the cities of Daegu, Daejeon and Gwangju. Korean consultants assisted by
selected foreign specialists are conducting the nine-month study, and issued
an interim report in October 1984. The final report is expected in mid-
1985. Study recommendations should form the core transport improvement plans
for the cities.
Regional Studies
3.13 The project financed the multimodal Kyeonggi (Seoul) region
integrated transport study, the objectives of which were to study land
transport requirements (road/rail) and to conduct feasibility studies for
proposed new links to determine the most cost-effective transport system for
the region. The two-phase study, conducted by French consultants in associa-
tion with a Korean firm, started in early 1984. The Phase I report was issued
in December 1984 and identified specific road/rail segments which should be
studied further. The Phase II (feasibility) study is now in progress and is
due for completion in November 1985. Since this is after the closing date of
the Railways VII loan, arrangements have been made for continued funding of
the study under the Coal and Cement Distribution Project (Loan 2267-KO). The
results of the feasibility study will be to identify the exact road network
components (probably a Seoul beltway and major feeder arteries) and rail
linkages (mostly suburban light rail) which will form the basis of the
Regional Transport Project tentatively scheduled for FY87.
Intercity (Seoul-Busan Corridor) Transport Study
3.14 The study's objective was to review the long-term transport
investment needs in the Seoul-Busan corridor and to examine the feasibility of
a High Speed Train (HST) between Seoul and Busan. The two-phased study by a
team of American, Korean and Danish consultants started in March 1983. Phase I,
which reviewed the multimodal alternatives, was completed in April 1984. It
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recommended expanding and upgrading several highways in the Seoul-Busan corri-
dor and introducing a high speed trair (like the French TGV or Japanese
Shinkansen) by 1997. The Phase I repoit was subject to detailed reviews by a
steering committee before approval was given to proceed to Phase II which was
a detailed feasibility study of the high speed train; this was completed in
February 1985. The Phase I study also recommended the immediate installation
of a Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) system on the rail lines from Suweon to
Daegu to improve signalling and train handling capacity. This is needed to
meet the capacity requirements of the growing express passenger train traffic
and also as an interim step until the HST can be built. The CTC system forms
the major component of the Seoul-Busan Corridor project which will be
presented to the Bank's Board for approval in June 1985.
Technical Assistance
3.15 This project component largely included providing consulting
services for implementing commercial accounting, costing and management
improvement programs. Its objective was to improve KNR itself and prepare it
for full autonomy by January 1987. Implementation of the various programs is
discussed under "Institutional Development" in paras. 6.01-6.04.
Training
3.16 The loan included funds for overseas training of staff, particularly
in the field of investment planning and computerized commercial and cost
accounting. This component was well executed. Several trainees were selected
and sent overseas, mostly to the U.S. and Japan for intensive courses. They
have all completed their courses, returned to KNR and have made significant
contributions to KNR, especially in implementing the commercial accounting
program.
Project Cost
3.17 The cost of the total project as originally approved in 1980 was W
350.5 billion (US$604.3 million). After the reductions in project scope in
1981, the total cost of the revised project was W 239 billion. The final cost
was W 277 billion (US$410.8 billion), representing an increase of 16% in Won
(or 12X in US$) above the revised estimate. The difference in cosq,overrun by
currency is due to extensive and repeated devaluations of the Won -/ during
the project period and the fact that cost estimates were based on the U.S.
1/ The Won was devalued five times in 1980 alone, from W 485 in January 1980
to an eventual W 682 to the US$ by November 1980. Annual Conversion
averages were W 485 at appraisal, W 607 in 1980, W 681 in 1981, W 720 in
1982 and W 783 in 1983, to the US dollar.
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dollar. However, given the rampant inflation 2/ prevailing in Korea during
the early project implementation period, it is commendable that costs were
contained to this extent. Overall the costs of project quantities were some-
what higher than the appraisal estimate, with unit prices substantially higher
than estimated for permanent way works, locomotives and railcars (except for
railcars for Seoul suburban traffic) while unit costs for double tracking,
crossing loops and station yards were below estimates. Details of actual and
appraisal costs are given in Table 3.3.
Loan Disbursements
3.18 Cumulative disbursements (detailed in Table 3.4) compared to
appraisal estimates were as follows:
FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85
(US$ million) ---
Appraisal 52.0 89.5 94.0 - -
Actual 9.8 75.3 86.1 92.0 93.0
Even though there was a slow start, most of the XKR portion of the loan
(US$88.2 million) was disbursed by end-FY83 as originally planned. Disburse-
ment of the remainder was delayed mainly by the urban transport studies
(US$2.6 million), the multimodal transport studies (US$3.0 million) and tech-
nical assistance and training (about US$0.2 million) where implementation took
more time than expected. As discussed (para. 3.05), there were also some
minor procurement delays which affected disbursements. A small, undisbursed
portion of the loan ($1.039 m) was eventually cancelled. It should be noted
that even though slower than appraisal estimates, disbursements were much
faster than the standard country profile which suggests a seven-year schedule.
Reallocation of Loan Funds
3.19 At KNR's request, the Bank loan funds disbursement by category was
changed on May 29, 1981 and on December 14, 1982 so as to utilize the unallo-
cated funds. The following table shows the original, reallocated and final
allocation of loan proceeds:
2/ The wholesale price index was: 1976-100, 1977 = 104.4, 1978 - 116.6,
1979 - 138.4, 1980 - 192.3, 1981 * 235.5, 1982 - 247.6, 1983 - 249.
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Reallocation
Loan of December Disbursed as of
Category Agreement 1982 April 23, 1985
- ---(US$ thous and )
1. Project Part C: Rail track
maintenance quipment 18,350 25,456 21,988
2. Project PFrt D: Breakdown
cranes, passenger & freight
cars 53,850 58,593 64,671
3. Project Part E: Work shop
equipment 2,080 2,196 466
4. Project Part G: Overseas
training and consultant
services for technical
assistance 1,900 1,955 1,551
5. Project Part H: Transport
studies and overseas training 5,800 5,800 4,285
6. Unallocated 12,020 0 0
Total 94,000 94,000 92,961
Fulfillment of the Main Loan Covenants
3.20 Compliance with covenants (other than those relating to financial
issues) was generally satisfactory. Problems affecting the financial cove-
nants are discussed in Chapter V and were more a result of macroeconomic fac-
tors and government policy than any actions/inactions by KNR management. In
areas of relative autonomy, KIR has fully and fairly complied with all cove-
nanted requirements. Table 3.5 details all major covenants and their degree
of compliance. It should be noted that many of the covenants in the Loan
Agreement for the Seventh Railways Project were superseded by new provisions
in Loan Agreement 2267-KO for the Coal and Cement Distribution Project.
IV. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS
Freight Traffic
4.01 Freight traffic data for the period 1966-1984 are given in Tables
4.1-4.3. In making traffic forecasts for this project at appraisal, a growth
rate of 31 to 5X per annum was used. This represented a conservative stimate
and an attempt to more accurately predict freight traffic because forecasts
under past projects were much too optimistic. Three scenarios for 1980-86
were made at appraisal, using high (5X p.a.), best (41 p.a.) and low (31 p.a.)
growth rates in freight ton-kilometers. The actual growth rate so far has
averaged 2X p.a., hence the low growth scenario was the closest to reality.
The following table compares actual ton-km with the three forecasts.
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RNR FREIGHT TRAFFIC 1979-84: ACTUAL AND FORECAST
(million ton-km)
Forecast
Year Actual High Best Low
1979 11,081 - - -
1980 10,798 12,044 11,532 10,975
1981 10,815 12,608 12,026 11,374
1982 10,892 12,860 12,356 11,734
1983 11,629 13,501 12,945 12,228
1984 12,033 14,085 13,329 12,589
4.02 The data show that freight traffic was adversely affected by the
economic downturn of 1980-81 and only recovered by early 1983 to its 1979
level. Following the Presidential assassination in 1980, the economy
stagnated and there was a nationwide downturn in construction as well as
industrial activity. There was little growth in demand for coal and a sharp
decline for cement, the two commodities on which KUR freight forecasts were
mainly based. The recovery since 1982 has been fairly strong, averaging 3.4%
p.a.; if such a growth rate is maintained, actual freight traffic will exceed
the targets set for 1986 under the low growth scenario. In future, KKR should
probably count on a 2-3X p.a. long-term growth rate in freight ton-km. For
the ten years 1975-1984 inclusive, it has averaged 2.91 p.a. growth in freight
ton-km. This period has included downturns, upturns, slow growth, rapid
growth and modest growth as shown on Chart 1 overleaf. It is probably repre-
sentative of the dependence of KNR freight traffic growth on the performance
of the economy as a whole.
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The following table compares the actual and forecast volumes of the major
commodities transported.
KNR FREIGHT TRAFFIC: ACTUAL AND FORECAST
(million ton)
Ibtal we Cauent Ore Oi Fertilizer Grain Cbntainer
Fore- Fore- Fore- Fore- Fore- Fore- Fore- Fore-
Year Actual cast Actual cast Actual cast Actual cast Actual cast Actual cast Actual cast Actual cast
1979 50.9 - 18.0 - 11.2 - 3.4 - 4.3 - 2.1 - 1.1 - 0.6 -
1980 49.0 52.3 18.6 18.0 9.8 11.5 3.4 -3.6 3.9 4.6 1.7 2.2 1.0 1.1 0.4 0.7
1981 48.8 54.0 21.4 18.2 8.4 12.0 3.9 3.8 3.2 4.8 1.9 2.2 0.6 1.2 0.5 0.9
1982 47.4 55.4 19.6 18.4 9.5 12.5 3.9 4.0 2.7 5.0 1.8 2.3 0.6 1.3 0.6 1.1
1983 50.5 57.4 20.1 18.6 11.1 13.0 4.1 4.2 2.6 5.2 1.6 2.3 0.7 1.4 0.8 1.5
1984 53.7 59.0 23.2 18.8 10.9 13.5 4.3 4.3 2.9 5.4 1.6 2.4 0,7 1.4 0.8 1.7
Passenger Traffic
4.03 Passenger traffic forecasts at appraisal were based on annual growth
rates between 5% and 7% in passengers and between 7% and 10% in passenger-
km. There was an underlying assumption of a continued 7% to 8% p,a. growth in
GNP and also that the Government would continue to maintain a restrictive
policy on the ownership and use of private automobiles. While the latter
assumption was correct, the actual GNP growth rate, still fairly high on a
long-term basis, suffered a brief decline in the early 1980s. Railway inter-
city passenger traffic then went into a decline, especially ordinary passenger
traffic, and has not fully recovered. It is expected that passenger traffic
will eventually recover, just as it did from the only previous major downturn
in 1970/71. The latter was caused by the 1970 opening of the Seoul-Busan and
Daejeon-Oaangju expressways and the resultant intense competition from buses
for intercity passengers.
4.04 Passenger traffic statistics are shown in Tables 4.4 to 4.6; data on
long distance passenger traffic are summarized overleaf:
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KNR: INTERCITY LONC DISTANCE PASSENGER TRAFFIC
No. of passensers (million) Passenger-km (billion)
Total Ordinary Ltd. Express Total Ordinary Ltd. Exgress
Year Fore- Fore- Fore- tore- Fore- Fore-
Actual cast Actual cast Actual cast Actual cast Actual cast Actual cast
1979 162.1 - 112.9 - 38.1 - 16.3 - 5.5 - 8.8 -
1980 164.9 171 116.1 114 37.3 45 16.4 17.8 5.9 5.5 8.5 10.3
1981 153.5 180 106.3 114 39.7 53 15.7 19.4 5.6 5.4 8.8 11.7
1982 143.3 189 97.9 115 43.1 60 15.1 20.9 5.2 5.4 9.2 12.9
1983 136.5 198 85.9 115 48.7 68 15.4 22.3 4.5 5.3 10.3 14.4
1984 131.1 208 75.4 116 53.8 76 15.2 23.7 3.6 5.2 11.0 15.7
The table shows actual figures compared with the low growth forecast for
passengers (51) and for passenger-km (71). A few trends are immediately
obvious. KNR has lost about 34 million passengers from its peak ridership of
approximately 165 million in 1980. All of the loss is due to a continuous
decline of 41 million in ordinary passenger patronage from its peak of 116
million in 1980 to a 15 year low of 75 million in 1984. The reverse of this
trend occurs in the case of the limited express service which gained nearly 17
million riders in the 1980-84 period. Most of the express passengers probably
transferred from ordinary trains as the rising income levels and mobility in
Korea led to an increase in the value of time. People are therefore more
willing and able to pay for higher levels of service. Ironically, this trend
of passenger growth (91 p.a., 1980-84) in the more profitable express train
services coupled with a decline (average 81 p.a., 1980-84) in ordinary train
services may prove ultimately to be beneficial to KNR profitability even
though total passenger patronage has declined.
4.05 In terms of passenger-km, a similar but somewhat modified trend
occurred. Overall passenger-km declined by only 7.31 over the period 1980-84
versus the 201 decline in the actual number of passengers. This again was due
to the qualitative change in KNR ridership - the partial substitution of
express passengers who traveled an average 206 km in 1984 for ordinary passen-
gers who only averaged 47 km. Hence the decline in overall passenger-km
actually masks a very important trend - that is, KNR has had a 7A p.a. growth
in passenger-km during 1980-84 for express train service. Chart 2 overleaf
shows actual and forecast intercity passenger traffic during 1967-86.
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4.06 The special express service (Saemaul trains) did not do as well as
expected, but is still a profitable service. Data on operations during 1979-
84 are summarized below:
KNR: SPECIAL EXPRESS SERVICE
Passengers Passenr-km Average distance
(million) million km
Year Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast
1979 2.4 - 772 - 322 -
1980 2.5 3.0 797 975 319 325
1981 2.2 3.5 722 1,120 328 320
1982 1.9 4.0 641 1,260 337 315
1983 1.9 4.5 607 1,395 319 310
1984 1.9 5.0 589 1,525 313 305
This service's higher fares relative to express trains or buses probably partly
explain the siowdown in patronage over the period. However, the average
distance has increased; this is the only passenger rail statistic to exceed
appraisal projections. If this continues and KNR ridership stabilizes, then
the decline in passenger-km may cease.
4.07 KNR's Seoul urban service (SMESRS) which started in 1974 grew at an
annual rate of 7.5Z p.a. in terms of passenger-km during 1980-84. This repre-
sents a considerable slowdown from previous growth rates, though in itself is
a good, sustainable rate of growth. It shows that the period of initial
acceptance and rapid growth in this service is over, and though there may be
occasional periods of return to past super-growth levels (usually whenever new
lines are opened), long-term growth may more likely match the recent 7%
figure. Some statistics follow:
KNR: SUBURBAN RAIL SERVICE
Passengers Passenger-km Average distance
(million) (billion) (km)
Year Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast
1979 240 - 4.3 - 17.9 -
1980 245 339 4.4 5.9 18.1 17.3
1981 268 420 5.0 7.2 18.6 17.0
1982 282 500 5.2 8.4 18.4 16.9
1983 315 579 5.6 9.6 17.8 16.7
1984 341 652 5.9 10.7 17.3 16.4
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Traffic Levels by Mode
4.08 For the transport sector as a whole, the railroad's market share has
been declining since 1966. Highway transport is the dominant mode in terms of
volume with an 82.8% share of the 430 million tons of domestic freight in
1982, a tremendous increase from its 47% share of 51 million tons of freight
in 1966. The railways managed only an 11% share in 1982, down from its 46.9%
share in 1966. The maritime share has increased to 6% during the period, up
by 1%. As indicated in the following table, the modal split in terms of ton-
km showed similar developments.
SHARES OF TOTAL FREIGHT TRANSPORT
1966 1971 1976 1981 1982
tkm Share tkm Share tkm Share tkm Share tkm Share
Mode (bil) (Z) (bil) (Z) (bil) (X) (bil) (X) (bil) (X)
Railroad 5.4 81.6 7.8 48.9 9.7 44.6 10.8 31.5 10.9 36.9
Highway 0.6 8.4 3.5 22.1 6.5 30.0 10.1 35.0 10.8 36.4
Maritime 0.7 10.0 (.7 29.0 5.5 25.4 7.9 27.5 7.9 26.7
Total 6.7 - 16.1 - 21.8 - 28.8 - 29.6
During 1966-82 total ton-km have more than quadrupled, but the railway has
only doubled the amount it carried. Highways handled the majority of the
growth in freight traffic, causing the railway market share to decline sub-
stantially. It is estimated that by end-1984 highway transport had the
absolute largest market share in ton-km.
4.09 A similar development occurred in passenger transport in which high-
way transport had a much higher growth rate than that of rail. As shown in
the following table, highway transport had the dominant share in both
passengers and passenger-km since before 1966; in the subsequent years the
dominance continued. To be sure, there was enough traffic growth overall
(13.7% p.a. average) in passenger-km from 1966 to 1982 to support all modes of
transport.
- 22 -
SHARES OF TOTAL PASSENGER TRANSPORT/a
1966 1971 1976 1981 1982
pkm Share pkm Share pkm Share pkm Share pkm Share
Mode (bil) (Z) (bil) (X) (bil) (X) (bil) (X) (bil) (X)
Railway 8.7 42.5 8.8 27.1 14.3 24.4 21.5 23.6 21.0 22.0
- intercity 8.7 8.8 12.4 21.2 16.6 18.2 15.8 16.5
- SMESRS n.a. n.a. 1.9 3.2 4.9 5.4 5.2 5.5
Highway 11.5 56.2 22.9 71.1 43.4 74.0 67.3 73.8 72.1 75.3
- intercity n.a. 11.9 37.0 25.0 42.7 35.5 38.9 38.2 39.9
- urban n.a. 10.9 34.0 18.4 31.4 31.7 34.9 33.9 35.4
Total 20.4 - 32.2 - 58.6 - 91.1 - 95.7 -
/a Figures may not add up due to rounding.
Railway passenger traffic growth averaged 7.6% p.a. overall during the period
1966-82; this is a little more than one half of overall traffic growth. The
railway has lost traffic share, perhaps irreversibly. However, as discussed
above (paras. 4.04-4.05), this is not necessarily a negative indicator because
the traffic actually lost (ordinary trains) may be more efficiently served by
other modes. The most important question now that KNR seems to be shedding
its uneconomic ordinary train traffic is will the growth in express trai
service demand be stable and continue at current levels.
KNR Operations
4.10 Selected operating statistics for KNR during 1975-83 are shown in
Table 4.7. Analysis of these performance indicators supports the well-known
fact that the level of KNR's operational efficiency is remarkable. The avail-
ability of most rolling stock remained high at around 90%. Due to the slow
growth in traffic, the average freight train load increased only slightly from
491 net tons in 1979 to 509 net tons by 1983. On the other hand due to the
intercity passenger downturn, the average number of passengers per train
decreased from 515 in 1979 to 496 in 1983. Overall there was an increase in
the total number of traffic units from 32.5 million in 1979 to 33.3 million by
1983; most of this increase was due to the growth of suburban rail (SMESRS)
services. Employee productivity increased over the period from 808,000
traffic units in 1979 to 846,500 in 1983; this was accompanied by a 2% drop in
total employees between 1979-89. Turnaround for freight cars also improved
from 5.0 days in 1979 to 4.76 days in 1983.
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V. FINANCIAL EVALUATION
5.01 In the five years prior to the start of project implementation, RNR
experienced a consistent 10% p.a. growth in traffic units. This performance
largely resulted from the tremendous growth in passenger-km (12% p.a.) during
that period. KNR therefore embarked on a large capacity expansion investment
program under the Seventh Railway Project in order to keep up with expected
traffic demand. KNR borrowed extensively, and to service the related debt had
counted on (a) a continuation of traffic growth leading to full utilization of
the additional capacity; &nd (b) a slowdown in inflation that would help to
control costs. Instead there was high inflation and a stagnation in traf-
fic. This led to underutilization of the new investments as overall traffic
at first declined slightly and only surpassed its 1979 level (32.5 billion
traffic units) in 1983 (33.3 billion-traffic units); hence overall growth for
the 1979-84 period averaged a mere 1.1% p.a. At the same time, operating
costs for these investments increased and also debt had to be serviced. The
combination of these factors led to a financial performance that was somewhat
below expectations. These results were reflected in KNR's income statement,
cash flow and balance sheets which form the background for the following
analysis.
KNR Revenues
5.02 Table 5.1 details KNR's income from operations during 1977-84. Some
of the main entries are repeated overleaf:
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SUMMARIZED INCOME STATEMENT
(Won billion)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Actual Actual Appr. Actual Appr. Actual Appr. Actual Appr. Fat. Appr.
Traffic units (bil) 32.5 32.4 35.5 32.4 38.9 31.9 42.0 33.3 45.2 33.9 47.9
Operating revem 208.4 280.6 316.2 356.9 421.9 417.3 506.2 470.9 604.9 524.4 684.7
Woring cost 182.5 253.0 258.2 318.5 321.9 381.8 387.0 418.1 459.8 441.7 520.8
Deprecation 26.1 28.7 24.9 43.6 29.5 51.3 34.6 57.9 39.9 64.6 44.9
Net operating
revemie (0.2) (1.1) 33.1 (5.2) 70.5 (15.8) 84.6 (5.1) 105.2 18.2 119.0
Interest 29.7 48.6 40.6 60.1 51.7 69.9 64.6 72.4 75.9 76.7 86.1
Net IncoaD (24.9) (40.7) (6.2) (62.9) 20.3 (74.3) 21.6 (71.6) 31.1 (52.5) 34.8
Subsidies 31.9 5.0 25.8 0.0 0.0 34.8 0.0 35.4 0.0 55.5 0.0
Bodk profit 7.0 (35.7) 15.9 (62.9) 16.7 (39.5) 17.6 (36.3) 26.9 3.0 30.7
Ratios:
Wordng (Z) 88 90 70 89 66 92 76 89 76 84 76
Operating (%) 100 100 82 101 78 103 83 101 83 97 83
Rate of return(X) 0 0 3.2 0 5.5 0 5.5 0 6.0 0.4 6.0
The data show that KNR gross operating revenues increased each year from W 208
billion in 1979 to over W 524 billion in 1984 even though there was little
change in the total number of traffic units during this period. This was due
to increased tariffs and the growth of the more profitable express passenger
services. Revenue per traffic unit averaged W 15.46 in 1984, up significantly
from W 6.41 in 1979. However, the rest of the income statement shows that
while close to covering operating costs, KNR revenues could not cover interest
payments and therefore it had substantial losses. Most of the losses can be
attributed to ordinary train service, for which the Government provides a
partial subsidy. Hence an otherwise good performance by improving the quality
of its ridership mix and increasing unit gross revenue was obscured by factors
beyond the control of KNR management such as the setting of appropriate
tariffs for the ordinary train services.
5.03 When examining these results it should be borne in mind that KKR's
financial performance is analyzed by overly conservative methods. This occurs
because Section 4.08 of the Seventh Railway Loan Agreement specifically prohi-
bits the inclusion of Government subsidies in KNR's operating revenues. In
reality, this means that KNR is penalized by factors beyond its control
because it is forced by Government to operate certain loss making services but
then cannot consider the Government subsidies it duly receives as part of its
operating revenue. In recognition of this paradox, it was decided during
recent negotiations for the Seoul/Busan Corridor Project to include Government
subsidies In operating revenues, a practice which is endorsed by the
International Accounting Standards Committee. This change in the method of
measuring operating revenues will be reflected in the loan agreements for
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future projects as well as for ongoing ones such as the Coal and Cement
Distribution Project. Using it will make a positive difference in KNR's
financial performance; for example if financial statements under the Seventh
Railways are thus restated the main indicators would be as follows:
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Net operating revenues 32 4 (5) 19 30 74
(Won billion)
Net income 7 (40) (63) (40) (36) 3
(Won billion)
Operating ratio 86 98 101 96 94 87
Rate of return 2.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.4 3.2
This table reinforces the fact that while performance is still below the Loan
Covenant requirements (rates of return of 3.12in 1980, 5.5% in 1981 and 1982,
and 6% thereafter) the railways have actually made progress during a period of
little traffic growth.
Tariffs
5.04 The following table shows that, over 1977-81, passenger tariff
increases slightly exceeded inflation every year except in 1980, and that by
December 1981 they had been increased 6% more than the consumer price index
(CPI) during the 4-1/2 year period. Freight tariff increases were below
inflation through mid-1980 but then exceeded the CPI substantially for the
rest of the period. Coal tariffs, which were historically lower than other
freight tariffs, were increased by over 90% between mid-1980 and the end of
1983.
Tariff indices
Dates
CPI of increases Passenger Freight
Mid-1977 100 Jan 1977 100 100
Mid-1978 115 Jun 1978 119 115
Mid-1979 135 May 1979 137 127
Mid-1980 175 Jan 1980 164 152
Mid-1981 215 Jun 1981 224 232
Dec 1981 222 Dec 1981 235 259
Mid-1982 232 Jul 1982 240 264
Dec 1983 239 Dec 1983 247 283
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However, these increases were generally applied across the board. As a result
some rates were still far short of covering costs. The most striking case
relates to ordinary passenger trains, tariffs fot which were even short of
covering variable costs.
Profitability by Service
5.05 The following table illustrates the changes in contribution to total
revenue by major passenger service and freight commodity in 1979 and 1983.
% Contribution to: Gross rev. Cost coverage (X)
Total Total per traffic Variable
revenue cost unit (W) Operating Total
1979 1983 1979 1983 1979 1983 1979 1983 1979 1983
Passenger
Spec. express 5.4 4.1 2.2 2.3 14.5 31.3 288 235 217 148
A/C express 2.7 10.7 2.4 5.5 10.8 19.5 184 275 113 167
Non A/C express 26.5 22.3 14.8 14.2 6.7 13.7 293 229 162 135
Ordinary 8.9 6.5 17.7 20.0 3.2 6.8 93 54 44 28
SMESRS 9.9 10.2 9.2 10.0 4.8 8.5 226 223 96 88
Passenger avg. 60.3 57.7 55.6 58.2 5.6 12.5 200 165 97 85
Freight
Coal 11.7 16.9 15.3 15.1 6.3 18.0 104 141 68 96
Cement 7.8 9.0 7.6 8.5 7.8 17.9 135 137 96 91
Ores 3.8 3.4 3.0 3.2 6.5 16.1 179 135 108 91
Oil 2.7 2.6 3.7 2.5 6.9 20.9 237 139 67 91
Fertilizer 1.7 1.6 2.6 2.0 6.8 16.1 103 103 61 66
Grain 1.2 0.9 1.5 1.1 6.8 15.8 116 111 69 68
Container - 1.2 - 0.7 - 17.3 - 220 - 141
Freight avg. 39.7 42.3 44.4 41.8 6.7 17.2 114 131 73 87
5.06 From this table it can be seen that express train services have
continued to be the major source of total KNR gross operating revenues by
starting at 34.6% in 1979 and rising to 37X of these revenues in 1983. At the
same time their costs rose slightly from 19.4% in 1979 to 22% of total costs
in 1983. The most improved service in terms of profitability and the best in
terms of total cost coverage was the Air Conditioned (A/C) express. Its con-
tribution to total revenue improved from 2.7% in 1979 to 10.7X in 1983;
furthermore these revenues exceeded total cost of providing the service by
67%. Ordinary train service has continued to be the major loss maker. In
1979 it contributed 8.9% of total revenues but incurred 17.71 of total costs;
this increased over the period and by 1983 it provided 6.5% of total revenues
buit was responsible for 20X of all costs. In 1983 ordinary train service had
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abysmally low cost covemges - only 54% of variable operating cost and an even
worse 28Z of total costs. Ordinary train service also has the worst unit cost
structure in that fixed operating costs and interest charges comprise almost
48% of its total unit costs. Its unit variable operating cost, at 52% of
total cost, is the lowest of all services; this stems from the costly, expen-
sive infrastructure needed to maintain this service to so many locations. As
a whole, passenger traffic suffered a mild decline both in contributions to
gross revenues, from 60% in 1979 down to 58% in 1983, and in terms of total
cost coverage from 97% in 1979 down to 85% in 1983.
5.07 Freight traffic has shown considerable improvement. On average,
freight traffic revenue covered 87% of total cost in 1983, up considerably
from 73% in 1979. Most of the major commodities - coal, cement and ores - had
coverages of total costs of over 90% in 1983, and reportedly after the 1984
tariff increases these coverages reached 98%. Coal is still the largest
freight contributor to gross revenue; in 1983 it contributed 17% of gross
revenues (up from 12% in 1979) and covered 96% of total cost. Container ser-
vice is very small, contributing about 1.2% of total revenue but highly
profitable as it covers 141% of total cost. Freight service as a whole has
also gained in total share of KUR revenues up from almost 40X in 1979 to over
42% in 1983. At the same time its contribution to total cost has declined
from just over 44% in 1979 to less than 42% in 1983.
5.08 Hence, except for ordinary train service, the overall trend of
profitability by service is good. Eventually, ordinary train service will be
less of a problem for KNR as it is declining in use. Even though losses on
this service will still be incurred, they will have a reduced impact on KNR
profitability as increasing shares of total revenues will come from the more
profitable services which are experiencing moderate to high growth.
Financial Situation
5.09 KNR operated at a net loss for about 4 years up to 1983; this has
resulted in the progressive deterioration of its working capital from a
negative Won 3.7 billion in 1977 down to negative Won 80 billion by 1981.
Working capital has since improved to an estimated negative W 44.5 billion in
1984, due mainly to tariff increases and the increases in revenue per traffic
unit. To cover the deficits in working capital, KNR had to increase its long-
term borrowing from local sources which led to substantial interest charges.
KNR was therefore not able to achieve the 1.5 ratio of current assets to
current liabilities provided for under Section 4.05 of the Loan Agreement.
5.10 The additional borrowing explains the gradual decline of KUR's debt
to equity ratio which fell from 32/68 in 1979 to an estimated 38/62 by 1984.
This ratio is not expected to decline much further as the KNR investment
program will not grow substantially in the near term. In the long term some
improvement is expected since, if current trends persist, KNR earnings will
continue to grow.
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Remedial Action Taken
5.11 At the time of negotiations for this project, the Government had
agreed to establish a revised cost-based tariff structure for KNR by
December 31, 1984. The agreement has only been partially met but the overall
efforts by Government in raising tariffs faster than increases in the consumer
price index have helped to curtail KNR losses. The investments included in
this project, by providing capacity increases for SMESRS and express services,
have also had a pronounced positive effect on KNR revenues. In future, the
best strategy for KNR seems to be the one it has already adopted, i.e., the
reduction in ordinary trains coupled with the expansion and aggressive
marketing of its profitable services.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
6.01 At the time of appraisal, it was felt that KNR's status as a semi-
autonomous agency prevented its management from enjoying the freedom in
planning, organizational and financial decision-making needed in dealing with
increasingly fierce competition and adapting to abrupt changes in traffic
demand and/or economic conditions. Full autonomy seemed to be the solution
and a study on how best to prepare KNR for this was carried out under the
Fifth (Loan 1101-KO) and Sixth (Loan 1542-KO) Railway Projects. Accordingly
agreement was reached at negotiations of the Seventh Project on a timetable
for implementing the short- and medium-term measures recommended by the study,
with the objective of making KNR a public corporation no later than January 1,
1987. These short- and medium-term measures were to focus on: (a) the estab-
lishment of a management information system and an aggressive marketing orga-
nization; (b) the strengthening of KNR's capabilities in economic analysis,
investment planning, financial management and accounting procedures, with
special emphasis on the introduction of performance budgeting and incremental
long-term variable costing; and (c) progressive re-organization of KNR's
managerial structure in order to ensure a smooth transitior to a public
organization.
6.02 At negotiations it was also envisaged that the same consulting team
(an American firm with Korean partners) who conducted the original study would
implement the study findings by 1982. However, KNR and the consulting team
disagreed over contract costs and KNR spent the next 20 months trying to con-
vince the American firm to lower its offer. Finally negotiations were broken
off in late 1981, and KNR decided to invite bids from other firms. After an
eight-month selection process, the contract with the lowest evaluated bidder
(another American firm in partnership with a Korean one) was signed on May 24,
1982 and work commenced shortly thereafter. The new consulting team initially
made a systematic review of its predecessor's plans and recommendations. This
took about six months. They then suggested implementing some of the measures
as originally envisaged but also proposed major changes in other areas.
6.03 Implementation of institutional development measures therefore
started in 1983, some two and one half years behind schedule. There were
still other problems within KNR itself which led to further delays and slowed
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implementation. The period from mid-1982 to the end of 1983 was one of insta-
bility at KNR with four changes in Directors. This made it difficult for the
consulting team to get needed cooperation as the new managements were busy
establishing and organizing themselves. The institutional building part of
the technical assistance component therefore could not gain full momentum.
6.04 Despite all this, some progress was made and the following measures
were fully or partly introduced: (a) the costing system; (b) commercial
accounting; (c) electronic data processing; (d) investment planning and bud-
geting procedures; and (e) periodic seminars for management training. Some
actions were postponed by the consulting team (e.g., incremental variable
costing) and others were redesigned (the management information system) to
suit the changing environment. Finally, in August 1984, the consulting team
prepared a new timetable for introducing the management improvement program
which will consist of the following among other things: (a) strategic plan-
ning; (b) implementation of a cost-based tariff system; (c) performance
budgeting; and (d) a management information system. The program will be
implemented under the ongoing Coal and Cement Project and the Seoul-Busan
Corridor Project. Implementation of the phased, long-term plan should proceed
smoothly, given the current relative stability within KNR.
VII. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION
7.01 The evaluation at appraisal analyzed separately the economic return
on capacity expansion investment in: (a) freight services, (b) passenger
services, and (c) suburban rail services. The appraisal's economic evaluation
focused on project i2vestments globally and on particular items when possible.
The largest investment group, accounting for nearly one half of all project
costs, consisted of investments which were primarily intended to increase
railway carrying capacity for the types of traffic best suited economically to
rail transport. The second group, amounting to 32% of project costs and also
consisting of capacity-increasing investments was for suburban passenger
services in the Seoul metropolitan area. The remaining project items were for
way and structures renewal (10%) and miscellaneous investments (12%).
7.02 The methodology followed for economic re-evaluation was the same as
that at appriasal. For ease of comparison, cost and benefit figures were com-
puted in end-1979 prices. The appraisal and recalculated rates of return are
listed below; details are given in Tables 7.1 to 7.3.
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ECONOMIC RATES OF RETURN (X)
Best Low
appraisal appraisal Completion
estimate estimate re-evaluation
Capacity increase for freight services 33 29 19
Capacity increase for passenger services 17 16 14
Seoul suburban service 19 17 16
Overall economic evaluation 22 19 15
7.03 The re-evaluated rates are lower mainly because of traffic short-
falls and the use of lower growth rates than at appraisal. As discussed in
paras. 4.01-4.07, there was a significant downturn in traffic and hence the
newly in3talled facilities were not fully utilized. In the long term it is
expected that all investments will prove worthwhile.
7.04 The benefit streams were computed according to the various
categories of investments. For freight, the capacity expansion benefits were
measured in terms of the transport cost savings for the overall economy,
calculated as the difference between the economic cost of rail transport and
the economic cost of the next best (highway) mode. For passenger service, the
capacity increase provided better quality special and limited express train
services. The economic costs of these services are slightly lower than bus
costs because rail services, when used to capacity in Korea, consume less fuel
per passenger-km than buses. The benefits of increasing the capacity of the
better quality passenger services were therefore measured in terms of people's
willingness to pay for the services over and above their financial costs. For
the suburban services, the benefits of increasing service were expressed in
terms of transport cost savings from the alternative mode, mostly buses and
cars. This benefit calculation was particularly conservative because it does
not include the higher costs of some diverted trips which may be made by taxis
or private cars, nor savings in road passenger time which would be affected by
the increased congestion which a bus transport alternative would impose on the
already busy streets.
VIII. THE ROLE OF THE BANK
8.01 The project continued the dialogue between the Government and the
Bank, which had been ongoing under the previous six projects. This has
resulted in further growth and development of KNR as an institution. Project-
assisted studies and technical assistance have also enabled the Government and
KNR to begin addressing financial issues as well as to better define KKR's
role in a future to be dominated by a multimodal transport outlook.
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8.02 Regarding KNR's financial performance, although there is an
accumulated deficit, the deficit is due to the ordinary trains which KNR is
forced to run on social service grounds. In areas where more managerial
freedom is allowed and more appropriate tariff policies are followed, KNR's
efficiency and productivity have grown to new highs. The Bank has been a
catalyst for change in these areas, specifically by assisting in the use of
traffic costing syscems to identify which services to encourage or discourage
and then placing an emphasis on investments for services in the first
category. This should lead in the long-term to a profitable, well run
organization.
8.03 The multimodal approach is a product of rapid changes in the Korean
transport situation and the overall loss in market shares by KNR to highway
transport. KNR had proposed building a new High Speed Train (HST) from Seoul
to Busan as a way of providing frequent, high quality service in this corridor
and hopefully offset the losses in market shares (para. 3.14). The Bank was
able to persuade KNR to conduct multimodal studies which examined the least-
cost alternative of providing mass passenger and freight transport in the
Seoul region as well as the Seoul-Busan corridor. Out of these studies have
come a more balanced approach to transport planning in Korea as well as
proposals for specific road and rail investments. The Bank's role has
therefore been critical to development of transport policy in KNR and Korea as
a whole. Since this was a first effort at a multimodal approach in Korea,
there were of course problems in coordination between all of the agencies
concerned in setting terms of reference, selecting consultants, reviewing the
various phases of the studies, etc. But it can be judged as well done and
such studies will form important parts of subsequent projects.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
9.01 The project has achieved its overall objectives of increasing KNi's
capacity to handle growing express passenger and freight services and
curtailing losses on ordinary trains. It has also paved the way for extensive
changes in KNR itself, with its emphasis on management, planning, costing and
economic analysis. The KNR implementation capability was excellent, and
although the economic and financial returns from the investments were not as
high as expected, this was due to problems in the economy as a whole and, to
some extent, Government's social policy. The project was probably most
valuable in providing the impetus for a turnaround in KNR's financial and
managerial performance.
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Table 3.1
KORBA
RAIIAYS VII (LOAN 1836-0)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Procurement Schedule for Bank-Financed Items(as of December 1984)
Events
I II III IV V VI VII
Rails Original schedule 04/15/80 05/01/80 06/15/80 07/15/80 08/01/80 12101/80 12/01/81
(33,800 tons) Actual 07/07/80 07/14/80 09/26/80 12/02/80 12/10/80 02/26/81 12/31/81
Track maintenance Original schedule 07/15/80 08/01/80 09/15/80 10/15/80 11/01/80 03/01/81 05/01/81
equipment Revised schedule 05/01/81 05/15/81 10/01/81 04/01/82
Actual 06/19/80 06/26/80 02/19/81 06/02/81 06/10/81 09/24/81 10/09/82
Track material Original schedule 11/15/80 12/01/80 01/15/81 02/15/81 03/01/81 07/01/81 10/01/81
workshop Revised schedule 05/01/81 05/15/81 10/01181 04/01/82
equipment Actual 06/19/80 06/26/80 02/19/81 06/02/81 06/10/81 08/18/81 02/20/82
Breakdown cranes Original schedule 06/15/80 07/01/80 08/15/80 09/15/80 10/01/80 10/01/81 10/01/81
(2) Actual 07/15/80 09/03/80 12/26180 08/11/81 04/27/81 05/19/82 05/19/82
Special express Original schedule 06/15/80 07/01/80 08/15/80 09/15/80 10/01/80 04/01/81 07/01/81
passenger care Revised schedule 05/01/81 05/15/81 11/15/81 12/09/82
(20) Actual 07/12/80 07/14/80 12/24/80 06/02/81 06/09/81 01/15/82 12/09/82
Limited express Original schedule 06/15/80 07/01/80 08/15/80 09/15/80 10/01/80 04/01/81 07/01/81
air-conditioned Revised schedule 05/01/81 05/15/81 11/15/81 12/09/82
Passenger cars Actual 07/12/80 07/14/80 12/24/80 06/02/81 06/09/81 07/14/81 05/25/82
(56)
Ltiited express Original schedule 04/15/80 05/01/80 06/15/80 07/15/80 08/01/80 12/01/80 07/01/80
regular passen- Revised schedule 05/01/81 05/15/80 11/15/81 12/09/82
ger cars (170) Actual 07/12/80 07/14/80 12/24/80 06/02/81 06/09/81 08/24/81 12/26/81
Freight cars Original schedule 06/15/80 07/01/80 08/15/80 09/15/80 10/01/80 06/01/81 04/01/81
(100) Revised schedule
Actual 10/08/80 11/19/80 03/13181 07/13/81 07/22/81 12/25/81 07/15/82
Rolling stock Original schedule 08/15/80 09/01/80 10/15/80 11/15/80 12/01/80 04/01/81 07/01/81
workshop Revised schedule 03/01/81 04/22/81 05/01/81 10/15/81 05/07/82
equipment Actual 06/19/80 06/25/80 03/06/81 04/22/81 05/07/81 09/04/81 06/10/82
The following items are additional to the original procurement schedule:
Rails (2,052 tons) Actual 12/14/82 04/11/83 06/10/83 01/04/84 01/09/84 12/11/84 02/06/85
Rails (750 tons) Actual 03106/84 05/12/84 07/12/84 08/08/84 08/08/84 02/23/85 03/25/85
Track maintenance Actual 11/12/81 12/17/81 05/12/82 06/02/82 06/04/82 09/03/82 07/20/83
equipment
Pcwer source cars Actual 02/02/82 02/05/82 02/26/82 07/09/82 07/13/82 04/15/83 04/15/83
(3)
Pawer source cars Actual 03/06184 05/12184 07/12/84 12/24/84 12/28/84 01/13/85 01/15/85
(3)
Notes Events: I - Bank's agreement on tender documents, II - bid invitation, III - bid opening (price quo-
tation), IV - Bank's agreement to wiard of contract, V - contract date, VI - start of delivery, VII -
coupletion of delivery.
KORSA
RAILWAtYS VII (LOAN 1836-*O)
LUOJT COWlZTION RUCET
Statue of ?roCu*e.fsnVt o knk innced Itt..
(Id ot Supteeiber 1984) Ie
Cotract
to" 
_ Aiit C.1.1. SMapotia Dnte
a_ount In contr;ct In 08$ Contt cted Aeta1SItem (O8$ Ul) Date IMber turrency equivalent Contractor rirt lst nirt tast equivalent tot"l
bLile and Trck fbiantenance Equient
bgits (33,800 tonse 14.35 12IV/t80 8026W8P3 $13,092,224 13,092.224 £98100 Ind. OV26/81 1231/81 02/0WSI 12129181 13,105,387.04 10012110/80 802659-F3 $3.407,310 3,407.310 tliStut b Co. - 09115/81 04/30/61 07/08/11 3.404,492.59 10010/31/81 813072- $1S.980,576 1,980.576 Kanon Ind. Co. - 02120/82 02/13182 02/13182 1.974,202.99 1CO
Rbll (2,052 tons) - addtL. 0109/84 840004-n3 V 1,063.026.288 1.367,764 KAnguon tad. Co. - 07108164 - _ - 0
fbils (750 toeo) - add t_ 08/08/84 841302-43 V 388,533.000 479.019 blWoun Ind. Co. - 12131/84 - -
- 0
Track minteneance equipment 3.50 06/10/61 811215-13 Ash 34,238,147.50 2,713,858.02 arma, %ngineering - 01/30/82 11/22/81 01129182 2,108,578.63 100
- 611216-F3 Sir 1,337,414.40 818721.19 filter gitneering - 07/20/82 10/09/62 11/02/82 452,586.32 1O0
- 811217-F3 $58.276 58,278 )britant 6 Co. - 10,20/81 0924/81 09/24/81 57,469.67 100811216-13 S81,782 61,782 Daoo Ind. 6 Co. - 11120/81 11/186181 11/18151 81,126.61 1tO
Track maintenance equipmnt - addL. 06/04/82 822UO-13 Y 23,649,42 1.407.478.93 Carmsn lsarttng - 01/20/83 12U17182 03109/83 1,372.754.30 tOOS 22821-F3 $610,700 610.700 Sno 1i Trading - 07/20/83 07/04/83 07/20/63 613,264.74 100822822-13 $42,351 42,351 Donel S3m_rce - 09/20/82 09/03/82 101291/2 41,680.32 tOO
Track noterial worlkhop equtpment 0.50 06/10/82 811219-fl $36,302,000 710,649.27 8n"i c_trce 11/20/81 02J20182 11113/18 11/30181 166t150.64 100
" 611220-13 w 9, 460,000 95,949.66 
- 12/20/81 12/19/81 02/201/2 79,852.46 S1088S11221-F3 V 1,750,000 2,823.94 
- 09/20/11 0925/81 09/1;VS1 2,549.42 1001 8 1222-13 t8,412 8,412 Ilsn Trading - 08/201t1 081881 OSI08/ltl 8,412.00 100
" 811223-fl $3,455 3,445 Seongl Tadwin - 12/20/81 11/05/81 11/05/81 6,412.00 tOO13224-fl $24,701.50 24,701.50 Itsa Trading - 09/20/61 10/24161 10/24/81 3.433.14 100
- 811225-f3 S15,340 15.340 
- 10/20/81 10/16181 10/16/81 IS461.61 10007/10/81 8115S5-F3 ON 247,243 107,711.32 Seongil Trading - 01/15/82 12/10/e1 12/10/61 106,71t.17 1008 611586-13 $70,469.86 70,469.S6 
- - 11/15/S1 06/31/81 06/31/81 70,469.86 100
Subtotal 18.35 26.559.574.69 23.687.286.57
{I-
I'
Loan ~~~~~~~~~~mount C. S.F ipa Veto.I aumoust n contract it us$ CCntracted 4ctu UN tue orslIttm (VS$ tin) Data amber currency equivalent Contractor rst at Fnrst Last equtvalent teeid
Of deun crams (2) 1.55 04127/81 8I1009-3 Y 320.353,528 1.520.447.50 mtrabunt Corp. 
- 04/lS/02 05/19J82 05/39/82 1,275.097.62 10DSpectal e.ress cart (20) 6.60 06/09/61 811193-13 S6.545.562 6,545.562 Sans8 Corp. 10/25182 011251S3 01115/82 12/28tS2 6.602.055.00 100Ltotted ere. air cond. cars (56) 14.40 06/09/81 811193-13 $14,939,695 14,939.695 04/25/82 11125/82 07114/81 05/25S/2 15,060.97S.20 to0Ltatted eapreas regular cars tl70) 28.00 * 811678-f3 S29.446.240 29.446,240 
- 11/25/S2 08/24/81 12/261S1 29.265.92.08 100Cnoat tank cars (100) 3.30 07122/81 81167S-73 54.576.400 4,576,400 
_ 08/30/62 12/251 071151S2 4.561.613.35 100Lwtted express peser source care (3) 07/13/82 824129-n $1,827,480 1,827,460 
- 06120/83 04/15/83 04/53 ,826.615.63 1t0
Subtotal S5.85 58.855.824.50 56.592.351.88
Polling Stock - Ibrkahop pulpwmnt
liorkabop equttpnat 2.08 05/07/81 810928-73 Y 10,402.600 504,794.42 Wanll Coemrce 01/10/82 07110/S2 09/10/81 01/0182 482,595.11 10t810930-fl Y 25.071,000 114.632.30 llmon Tradiag 
- 01/30/82 10/27/81 10/27/61 109.572.10 too
- 810932-" $235.862 235,862 tee Rio Tradi 
- 10/25/81 09/04/S1 09/06/81 235.862.00 1to
* 810933-3 $484,404 484,404 T1eoe Ttraing 
- 06/10/62 - 06/10/S2 491,27S.39 tOO180934-3 $54,638,460 249,823.79 Tgeu Co. - 02/28/S2 t2/20/81 121/20/1 245,036.19 10062481 109135-113 $831,420 381,420 0-Tang Canaercial - 11/28/81 11/28/81 I1/28/$I 376,4675.22 10006t24/81 S11444-3 1 13,156,000 64,597.22 brubent Corp. 
- 03/30182 04128/2 04/2S/62 s4,019.09 tOO811445-f3 r 46,520,000 228,417.12 genil Cuerc 
- 02/28/82 02/06/62 02/06/t2 198,752.61 100
Subtotal 2.06 2.263,951.45 2,1ff.590.1
Trinin and Conltant Servtice
Conrultant services 1,378,t85 1.353.796.17 k
Statf traintin 265,076 197,185.65 
Subtotal 190 1,643.261 1.550.982.02 94
Unllocated 12.02
Tot-l 88.20 86.819.422.64 86.026.213.18 97
WIw
KOREA
RAILWAYS VII (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Total Project Cost
('Won million)
Appraisal estimate Revised estimate (1981) Actual cost (1980-84)/a
Categories L F T L F T L F T
KNR Investments Starting in 1980/81
Now line construction 7,330 - 7,330 - - - - - -
Increase in line & station capacity 76,385 17,510 93,895 40,454 - 40,454 39,608 2,137 41,765
Way & structures 21,520 10,645 32,165 27,337 13,454 40,791 31,745 16,661 48,136
Mbtive power & rolling stock 63,895 39,815 103,710 66,419 45,565 111,984 61,396 58,593 119,989
Repair facilities 11,265 1,870 13,135 11,145 1,522 12,667 49,545 1,811 51,356
Telecom, power, buildings, etc. 8,145 4,670 12,815 12,873 2,350 15,223 12,108 1,610 13,718
Subtotal 188,540 74,510 263,050 158,228 62,891 221,119 194,132 80,812 274,944
Physical contingencies 10,119 2,626 12,745 - - - - - -
Price contingencies 58,513 12,806 71,319 9,537 2,809 12,346 - - -
Total - Part A 257,172 89,942 347L114 167.765 65,700 233,465 194,132 80,812 274.944
Training and Technical Assistance
for the Government
Training, transportation planning - 115 115 - 115 115 - 107 107
Tech. assistance, feasibility studies - 1,740 1,740 - 1,740 1,740 - 756 756
Tech. assistance, urban studies - 1,510 1,510 - 1,510 1,510 - 1,450 1,450
Total Part B - 3,365 3,365 - 3,365 3.365 - 2,313 2.313
Grand Total 257,172 93,302 350,479 167,765 69,065 238,830 194,132 83,125 277,257
Grand Total in US$ Million /b 443.3 160.9 604.3 257.8 106.1 366.9 287.6 123.2 410.8
/a At December 31, 1984. Figures for 1980-84 actual are in current terms. Costs should therefore be compared with I
appraisal estimates Including contingencies. .
/b US$1.00 - V 485 at appraisal, W 651.0 at time of project revislon, and W 675 over project lifetime.
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Table 3.4
KOREA
RAILWAYS VII (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Estimated and Actual Disbursements
(US$ million)
IBRD Actual
fiscal year Appraisal Actual total disbursements
and quarter estimate disbursement (%)
1980/81
To 09/30/80 0.2 0
To 12/31/80 7.5 0
To 03/31/81 22.0 4.2 19
To 06/30/81. 52.0 9.8 19
1981/82
To 09/30/81 74.0 32.4 44
To 12/31/81 84.0 54.5 65
To 03/31/82 87.5 71.5 82
To 06/30/82 89.5 75.3 84
1982/83
To 09/30/82 91.0 77.5 85
To 12/31/82 92.5 82.5 89
To 03/31/83 93.5 83.8 90
To 06/30/83 94.0 86.1 92
1983/84
To 09/30/83 94.0 87.2 93
To 12/31/83 87.9 94
To 03/31/84 89.9 96
To 06/30/84 92.0 97
1984/85
To 09/30/84 92.2 98
To 12/31/84 92.2 98
Closing date 12/31/83 12/31/84
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KOREA
RAILWAYS VII (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Compliance with Covenants in the Loan ARreement
Action required Action taken
Section 3.02
(a) The Borrcwer shall, not later Action not yet due.
than January 1, 1987 or such
other date as shall be agreed
with the Bank, take all such
action as shall be necessary to
establish KNR as a public corpo-
ration under the laws of the Bor-
.rwer with powers, inter alia,
(i) to incur debt, (ii) to fix
the emoluments of its staff,
(iii) to prepare and submit to
MOT and EPB its proposed budgets
in a commercial form, (iv) to
have reasonable flexibility in
adjusting approved operating bud-
gets to meet cost changes arising
out of unexpected fluctuations in
railroad traffic, (v) to open and
maintain an account with the Bank
of Korea for revenue receipts and
payments of obligations, (vi) to
maintain its records in accord-
ance with commercial accounting
procedures, and (vii) to make
proposals relating to its tariff
structure.
(b) The Borrower shall implement such Action not yet due.
measures as shall be agreed with
the Bank as a first phase toward
meeting the objectives referred
to in paragraph (a) of this Sec-
tion.
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Action required Action taken
(c) The Borrower shall, not later Plan provided in August 1984.
than January 1, 1984 or such
other date as shall be agreed
with the Bank, furnish to the
Bank for review a report on the
measures t8ken and a plan for
additional measures, both legal
and organizational, to be taken
to meet the objectives referred
to in paragaraph (a) of this sec-
tion.
Section 3.04
In order to assist KNR In carry- Refers to the implementation f the
ing out Part G of the Project, the management study carried out under
Borrower shall cause KNR to employ the Fifth Railway Project. An Ameri-
consultants whose qualifications, can firm in association with a Korean
experience and terms and conditions firm was selected. The contract
of employment shall be satisfactory between KNR and the consultants'
to the Bank. partnership was signed and approved
by the Bank on May 24, 1982.
Section 3.08
The Borrower shall: (a) complete These studies were to be carried out
and furnish to the Bank for review, on the basis of recommendations made
not later than June 30, 1982, feasi- in the Comprehensive Transport Study,
bility studies, by consultants whose which was not successfully comple-
qualifications and terms of reference ted. The Government and the Bank
are acceptable to the Bank, of future have agreed that the follcwing stu-
transport investment projects for the dies be conducted (a) Seoul-Busan
period 1982-86; and (b) implement transport corridor (completed in late
thereafter such recommendations a 1984) and (b) the Kyonggi Region
shall be agreed with the Bank. transport (due for completion in
early 1985).
Section 3.09
The Borrower shall: (a) complete The Seoul Study was completed in
and furnish to the Bank for review, 1984, the Busan Study is under way
not later than June 30, 1982, a and due for completion in May 1985;
study, by consultants whose qualifi- the Secondary Cities Study started in
cations and terms of reference are late 1984 and is due for completion
acceptable to the Bank, of the urban in mid-1985.
transport needs of the greater Seoul,
Busan and other areas; and (b) imple-
ment thereafter such recommendations
as shall be agreed with the Bank.
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Action required Action taken
Section 3.10
The Borrower shall, not later Completed: six trainees were selected
than June 30, 1983, take all such in early December 1981. Most of the
actiou in consultation with the Bank training was provided in the USA.
as shall be necessary to train the
Borrower's staff in transport plan-
ning and coordination.
Section 4.02
(a) Standard accounting convenant. Complied with.
(b) Standard audit convenant. Complied with.
Section 4.04 Satisfactory action has been taken.
The Borrower shall cause KNR not
later than December 31, 1984 to es-
tablish a revised tariff structure
acceptable to the Bank.
Section 4.05
The Borrower shall cause KNR to Superseded by Section 4.08 of Loan
take all necessary measures as shall Agreement 2267-X0.
be required by KNR to maintain work-
ing capital satisfactory to the Bank,
including attaining by December 31,
1983 a ratio of current assets to
current liabilities of not less than
1.5 and maintaining such ratio there-
after.
Section 4.06
(a) The Borrower shall take or cause The Government took the decision in
to be taken all action necessary 1981 to double the Iri-Songjeongri
to ensure that substantial section (101 km) of the Honam line at
changes in KNR's Investment Plan an estimated total cost of Won 152
shall only be made with the con- billion ($227 million). Since only
currence of the Bank. Won 8 billion ($12 million) were
spent in 1981, which was the last
year of KNR's 1977-81 investment
plan, the decision did not involve a
formal substantial change as defined
in the Loan Agreement.
(b) For the purposes of this Section
"'substantial changes" shall mean
changes involving in the aggre-
gate either an increase or a de-
crease of more than 20 billion
Won in the estimated cost of the Superseded by Section 4.11 of Loan
Investment Plan. Agreement 2267-K0.
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Action required Action taken
Section 4.06
(a) Except as the Bank shall other- Superseded by Section 4.09 of Loan
wise agree, KNR, or the Borrower Agreement 2267-K0.
acting on behalf of KNR, shall
not incur any long-term debt un-
less the net revenues of KNR for
the fiscal year next preceding
such incurrence, or for a later
12-month period ended prior to
such incurrence, whichever amount
is greater, shall be not less
than 1.1 times the maximum debt
service requirements for any suc-
ceeding fiscal year on all long-
term debt then outstanding (in-
cluding the long-term debt to be
incurred).
Section 4.08
The Borrower shall cause KNR to Superseded by Section 4.07 of Loan
take all necessary measures (includ- Agreement 2267-K0.
ing but not limited to KNR's tariff
increase) satisfactory to the Bank as
shall be required by KNR to: (a)
cover its operating costs (excluding
depreciation) and debt service re-
quirements and finance a reasonable
proprotion of its capital expendi-
tures commencing fiscal year 1980;
and (b) earn an annual rate of return
of not less than (i) 3.22 in fiscal
year 1980, (ii) 5.5% in fiscal year
1981 and 1982, and (iii) 6% there-
after.
Section 4.10
Except as the Bank shall other- Complied with.
wise agree, the Borrower shall cause
KNR to carry out a revaluation of
KNR's fixed assets on an annual
basis, in accordance with appropriate
and consistently maintained methods
of valuation acceptable to the Bank.
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KOREA
RAILWAYS VII (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Loan Financed Items
Unit Total
Cost Cost
Unit Quantity (US$) (USs M)
A. RNR Project
1. Rails, 50 kg/m, for renewal tons 25,802 559 14.42
2. Rails, 60 kg/m, for renewal tons 10,800 547 5.91
3. Track maintenance quipment ea 12 4.73
4. Track material workshop equipment ea 18 0.48
5. Breakdown cranes no. 2 640,000 1.28
6. Passenger Cars
Special express coaches no. 20 330,000 6.54
Limited express air cond. coaches no. 43 220,000 9.40
Limited express air cond. dining cars no. 6 276,000 1.66
Limited express power source cars no. 13 524,000 6.92
Limited express regul - coaches no. 170 172,000 29.26
7. Freight cars no. 100 45,600 4.56
8 Motive Power and Rolling Stock Workshop
equipment ea 11 2.19
9. Training and technical assistance - - - 1.55
TOTAL - - 88.90
B. Government
1. Transport sector studies 1.06
2. Urban studies 2.03
3. Training HOT 0.15
Total Government 3.24
GRAND TOTAL 92.14
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KOREA
RAILWAYS VII (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJCT COMPLETION REPORT
KNR Freight Traffiet 1966-84 Actual
5fllion tons)
MaJor commodities Others
Ferti- Sub- General Private MCon- Mll
Coal Cement Ore Oil lier Grain total cargo car return tainer tary KNR Total
Actual
1966 10.50 1.70 1.10 0.90 1.20 1.20 16.60 4.40 - - 2.10 0.90 24.00
Second FYP
1967 11.20 2.20 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.30 18.70 5.60 - - 2.30 0.80 27.40
1968 9.70 3.20 1.70 1.70 1.50 1.60 19.40 5.90 - - 2.80 1.00 29.10
1969 10.40 4.40 1.70 2.10 1.20 1.40 21.20 5.60 - - 2.70 1.20 30.70
1970 12.10 4.90 1.80 2.40 1.10 1.30 23.60 5.00 - - 2.10 1.00 31.70
1971 12.20 5.80 1.60 2.50 1.10 1.40 24.60 4.60 - - 1.90 0.90 32.00
Third FYP
1972 11.30 6.00 1.50 2.20 1.30 1.60 23.90 4.60 - - 2.40 0.70 31.60
1973 13.60 7.50 2.30 2.70 1.50 1.60 29.20 5.50 - 0.20 1.70 1.00 37.60
1974 15.10 7.80 2.90 2.70 1.90 1.30 31.70 5.10 - 0.20 1.30 1.10 39.40
1975 16.70 9.00 3.00 3.10 2.20 1.00 35.00 3.50 1.50 0.20 1.40 1.10 42.70
1976 16.10 10.20 3.40 3.10 1.80 1.30 35.90 3.20 1.60 0.30 1.50 1.30 43.80
Fourth mP
1977 17.50 10.30 3.20 3.50 2.10 1.20 37.80 4.60 1.90 0.50 1.50 1.30 47.60
1978 17.90 10.90 3.10 3.80 2.20 1.20 39.10 4.80 2.00 0.60 1.50 1.60 49.60
1979 18.00 11.20 3.40 4.30 2.10 1.10 40.10 4.70 2.00 0.60 1.50 2.00 50.90
1980 18.60 9.80 3.40 3.90 1.70 1.00 38.40 4.80 1.80 0.40 1.40 2.20 49.00
1981 21.40 8.40 3.90 3.20 1.90 0.60 39.40 4.40 1.60 0.50 1.30 1.60 48.80
Fifth FYP
1982 19.60 9.50 3.90 2.70 1.80 0.60 38.10 4.30 1.50 0.60 1.40 1.50 47.40
1983 20.10 11.10 4.10 2.60 1.60 0.70 40.20 4.70 1.60 0.80 1.40 1.60 50.50
1984 23.20 10.90 4.30 2.90 1.60 0.70 43.60 4.60 1.60 0.80 1.40 1.70 53.70
Note: Since 1977, general cargo includes slag and gypsum previously included under ore. Slag and gypeti accounted for
0.8 million tons in 1977 and 1.1 million tons in 1979. Return of private cars, mostly oil tankers, are now shown
separately from general cargo. KNR charges half the tare weight at Class III freight rate for this traffic.
Source: KNR.
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KOREA
RAILWAYS VII (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Rail Freight Traffic: 1966-84 Actual
(Million tn-km)
Yajor commodities Others
Ferti- Sub- General Private car Con- WIT!
Years Coal Cement Ore Oil liter Grain total cargo return tainer tary KNR Total
Actual
1S66 2,077 476 269 238 181 328 3,575 1,180 - - 403 2Q 5,450
Second FYP
1967 2,306 565 335 423 202 338 4,169 1,472 - - 454 83 6,178
1968 2,125 845 368 589 312 406 4,645 1,577 - - 548 97 6,867
1969 2,397 911 402 624 330 384 5,048 1,602 - - 553 125 7,328
1970 2,785 1,003 453 641 312 402 5,595 1,526 - - 439 148 7,709
1971 2,861 1,222 435 648 344 403 5,913 1,281 - - 449 198 7,841
Third FTP
1972 2,613 1,126 347 574 347 402 5,337 1,172 - - 575 157 7,241
1973 3,194 1,344 568 568 420 381 6,475 1,414 - 72 433 197 8,591
1974 3,396 1,336 751 579 525 334 6,921 1,433 - 85 357 209 9,005
1975 3,677 1,437 760 625 590 256 7,345 960 304 92 385 207 9,293
1976 3,654 1,804 889 638 516 352 7,854 858 280 110 399 227 9,728
Fourth FYP
1977 3,933 1,781 785 732 561 289 8,081 1,290 308 232 383 215 10,509
1978 3,963 1,846 741 868 595 338 8,351 1,338 358 275 376 228 10,926
1979 3,829 2,085 817 931 525 351 8,538 1,240 382 254 411 256 11,081
1980 3,943 2,018 1,798 833 461 310 8,363 1,249 352 179 406 249 10,798
1981 4,413 1,793 963 660 488 158 8,475 1,257 303 229 374 177 10,815
Fifth FYP
1982 4,220 2,069 960 590 503 215 8,557 1,486 - 280 395 171 10,892
1983 4,413 2,366 997 595 458 256 9,085 1,678 - 328 365 173 11,629
1984 4,797 2,339 1,062 643 467 232 9,540 1,591 - 347 367 188 12,033
Notes Until 1975, return of private cars and containers were included in general cargo.
Sources KNR and lank.
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KOREA
RAILWAYS VII (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Rail Freight Traffic: 1966-84 Actual
(Average distance in km)
Maior cosodities Others
Ferti- General Private car Con- Mili-
Years Coal Cement Ore Oi liter Grain cargo return talner tary KNR Total
Actual
1-966 208 284 250 344 160 267 268 - - 192 170 127
Second FYP
1967 206 257 239 302 168 260 263 - - 197 104
1968 219 264 216 346 208 254 267 - - 196 97
1969 321 207 236 297 275 274 286 - - 205 104
1970 230 205 252 267 284 309 305 - - 209 148
1971 233 211 265 293 303 289 279 - - 234 113 245
Third FnP
1972 232 188 231 265 267 244 258 - 446 242 150 230
1973 235 179 247 239 273 238 255 - 439 260 147 228
1974 226 171 255 240 278 265 262 - 440 273 151 227
1975 221 160 257 223 268 256 279 185 439 270 144 217
1976 228 177 261 224 287 273 276 170 439 270 148 223
Fourth FYP
1977T 225 171 251 224 258 251 279 169 440 258 131 221
1978 221 170 242 229 262 277 277 183 440 260 139 220
1979 213 187 239 217 254 305 264 190 438 269 127 218
1980 212 205 238 213 270 315 264 194 440 283 112 220
1981 206 213 247 206 257 263 286 189 458 288 111 222
Fifth FYP
1982 215 217 246 218 279 358 - - 466 282 114 229
1983 219 213 243 229 286 319 258 - 410 261 116 230
1984 206 215 247 222 292 330 257 - 434 262 111 224
Source: KKR and Bank.
KOREA
RAILWAYS VII PROJECT (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETIOIN REPORT
KNR Intercity Passenger Traffic: 1966-84 Actual
Number of passengers (million) Passenger-km (million) Average distance (km)
Com- Long dis- MiWi- Conm- Long dis- Mili- CM- Long dis- Miii-
muter tance tary Total muter tance tary Total muter tance tary Total
Actual
1966 38.40 98.00 1.90 138.30 830 7,288 546 8,664 21.61 74.37 287.37 62.65
Second FYP
1967 41.60 108.40 1.90 151.90 883 8,150 543 9,576 21.23 75.18 285.79 63.04
1968 38.70 110.60 1.60 150.90 828 9,280 482 10,590 21.40 83.91 301.25 70.18
1969 37.90 114.80 2.00 154.70 799 9,680 .598 11,077 21.08 84.32 299.00 71.60
1970 38.20 91.40 1.70 131.30 854 8,425 539 9,818 22.36 92.18 317.06 74.78
1971 41.40 85.20 1.60 128.20 940 7,300 510 8,750 22.71 85.68 318.75 68.25
Third FYP
1972 26.30 109.20 1.60 137.10 629 8,914 519 10,062 23.92 81.63 324.38 73.39
1973 22.50 118.90 1.60 143.00 552 9,681 487 10,720 24.53 81.42 304.38 74.97
1974 20.60 117.60 1.60 139.80 481 9,581 471 10,533 23.35 81.47 294.38 75.34
1975 15.10 122.00 1.40 138.50 326 10,626 434 11,386 21.59 87.10 310.00 82.21
1976 17.20 130.10 1.30 148.60 367 11,678 395 12,440 21.34 89.76 303.85 83.71
Fourth FYP
1977 17.40 143.50 1.30 162.20 380 13,782 401 14,563 21.84 96.04 308.46 89.78
1978 18.20 155.70 1.70 175.60 402 15,670 516 16,588 22.09 100.64 303.53 94.46
1979 19.60 162.10 1.30 183.00 434 16,253 399 17,086 22.14 100.27 306.92 93.37
1980 18.90 164.90 1.20 185.00 428 16,376 400 17,204 22.65 99.31 333.33 92.99
1981 18.00 153.50 1.30 172.80 410 15,740 403 16,553 22.78 102.54 310.00 95.79
Fifth FTP
1982 17.00 143.30 1.20 161.50 405 15,051 381 15,837 23.82 105.03 317.50 98.06
1983 16.30 136.30 1.00 153.60 400 15,363 310 16,073 24.50 112.66 310.00 104.57
1984 14.60 131.10 1.40 147.10 376 15,190 396 15,962 25.70 115.90 283.10 108.50
Source: KRNEBank.
OwA
RAILAYS VII PROJECT (LOAN 1836-KG)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KNR Long-Distance Iatercity Passenger Traffic by Type of Service 
- 1971-84 Actual
Number of passengers (million) Passenger-km (million) Awerage distance (km)Limited expre s LT1ited express L_ ited expressSpec. _on- Sub- Ord. Spec. &on- Sub- Ord. Spec. Non- S94b- Ord.exp. A/C A/C total exp. Ord. Tbtal exp. A/C A/C total exp. Ord. Total exp. A/C A/C total emp. Ord. Total I
-J
Actual 
t
1971 0.30 
- 3.80 3.80 
- 81.70 85.80 117 
- 1,071 1.071 
- 6,112 7,300 390 
- 282 282 
- 7S 85Third FmP
1972 0.40 
- 5.90 5.90 
- 102.90 109.20 47 
- 1,653 1,653 
- 7,115 8,915 368 
- 280 280 
- 69 82
1973 0.50 
- 7.60 7.60 
- 110.80 118.90 183 
- 2,105 2,105 
- 7,395 9,681 366 
- 277 277 
- 67 eI
1974 0.60 
- 8.80 8.80 4.40 103.80 117.60 234 
- 2,224 2,224 940 6,183 9,581 390 
- 253 253 214 60 81
1975 0.80 
- 11.50 11.50 4.70 104.80 121.80 298 
- 2,862 2.862 1,004 6,463 10,627 373 
- 249 249 214 62 87
1976 1.30 
- 15.00 15.00 5.40 108.30 130.00 465 
- 3,673 3,673 1,025 6,516 11,679 358 
- 245 245 190 60 90Fourth FTP
1977 1.60 0.40 27.40 27.80 8.50 105.60 143.50 550 122 6,291 6,413 1,357 5,463 13,783 344 305 230 231 160 52 96
1978 1.90 1.60 34.40 36.00 9.40 108.40 155.70 645 461 7,852 8,313 1,287 5,425 15,670 339 288 228 231 137 50 101
1979 2.40 2.00 36.10 38.10 8.70 112.90 162.10 772 530 8,252 8,782 1,207 5,492 16,253 322 265 229 230 139 49 100
1980 2.50 3.00 34.30 37.30 9.00 116.10 164.90 797 727 7,739 8,466 1,230 5,883 16,376 319 242 226 227 137 51 99
1981 2.20 8.80 30.90 39.70 5.30 106.30 153.50 722 2,040 6,793 8,833 616 5,569 15,740 328 232 220 222 116 52 103Fiftb FmP
1982 1.90 9.70 33.40 43.10 0.40 97.90 143.30 641 2,210 6,984 9,194 47 5,169 15,051 337 228 209 213 118 53 10S
1983 1.90 10.80 37.90 48.70 
- 85.90 136.50 607 2,585 7,680 10,265 
- 4,491 15,362 319 239 203 211 
- 52 113
1984 1.90 13.10 40.70 53.80 
- 75.40 131.10 589 3,070 7,947 11,017 
- 3,582 15,190 313 234 195 206 
- 47 116 g
Source: Kb9|Bank.
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KOREA
RAILWAYS VII PROJECT (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KNR Seoul Urban (SMESRS) Passenger Traffic - 1971-84 Actual
Number of passengers (million) Passenger-km Average dis-
Commuter Noncommuter Total (million) tance (km)
Actual
1974 5.90 22.70 28.60 545 19.06
1975 17.10 65.30 82.40 1,540 18.69
1976 19.10 80.50 99.60 1,865 18.72
Fourth FYP
1977 25.90 113.50 139.40 2,536 18.19
1978 38.30 157.10 195.40 3,466 17.74
1979 50.20 190.50 240.70 4,300 17.86
1980 50.00 195.70 245.70 4,436 18.05
1981 56.20 212.50 268.70 5,005 18.63
Fifth FYP
1982 64.60 217.40 282.00 5,196 18.43
1983 78.00 237.70 315.70 5,615 17.79
1984 87.60 254.30 341.90 5,916 17.30
Source: KNR/Bank.
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Table 4.7
MUIMAY8 VtI (LOA 1836-tO)
PRJC CO ?OIN REPOMR
oR Sulected operatina Statietice (1975-83)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
S81113 (at end of year)
MF-$ lwte1n.th (km) 3,144 3, 144 3,142 3,153 3,158 3,135 3,121 3,121 3,117
-f8tndard gauge (1 435 a) 3,096 3,097 3,095 3,106 3,111 3.088 3,074 3,074 3,070
Warro gauqo (0.762 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Doublo track 561 567 602 607 601 720 714 714 714
Electrifted 402 402 419 419 419 429 429 429 428
Number of stations 566 566 571 590 583 585 586 58 576
Average distance between 5.56 5.56 5.50 3.44 5.42 5.36 5.33 5.31 5.41
stations (km)
8Uoy (at end of year)
Nber of Soplovees 39,560 39,293 40,017 40,377 40,186 40,034 40,533 40,431 39,357
Pe n nent 33,748 33,481 33,266 33,685 33,492 33,477 34,526 34,379 33,586
Temporary 5,801 5,812 6,751 6,692 6,694 6.557 6,007 6,052 5,771
ROLLING 8SOK /a
DiseeI Locomotive. Main Line
In fleet (no.) 300 330 329 330 348 353 367 312 368
Available (no.) 260 385 286 291 312 316 328 340 331
Available (2) 86.t 86.4 86.9 88.2 89.7 89.5 89.4 91.2 89.9
Diesel locomotive 8untero
-nHr flet (no.) 41 41 57/ 56 56 62 57 59 71
Available (no.) 39 36 48 49 49 52 51 53 63
Available (2) 95.1 87.8 84.2 87,5 87.5 83.9 89.4 89.8 88.7
Blectrio Locomotive.. ihbn Line
In fleet (no.) 66 65 81 89 90 90 90 90 90
Available (no.) 56 55 69 80 81 81 80 81 76
Available (2) 84.8 84.6 85.2 89.9 90.0 90.0 88.9 90 84.4
Diesel Railcars P?wred Units
In fleet (no.) 119 123 120 119 118 123 119 126 124
Available (no.) 86 98 90 94 97 103 98 110 111
Available (2) 72.3 79.7 75.0 79.0 82.2 83.7 82.4 87.3 89.5
UEectric Pailcars Powered Units
rn fleet (no.) 126 126 135 193 235 279 328 340 340
Available (no.) 110 114 118 173 209 223 297 307 309
Available (2) 87.3 90.5 87.4 89.6 88.9 80.0 90.5 90.3 90.9
Paa-enh9r Care, ncluding lailcar Trailers
In fleet (total no.) 1,712 1,760 1,803 1,765 1,794 1,858 1,993 2,149 2,146
Airconditioned coaches 65 71 70 101 141 228 305 391 402
Other coaches 1,293 1,335 1,378 1,295 1,313 1,300 1,350 1,437 1,446
Sleeping care 27 29 31 36 35 35 32 33 33
Restaurant cars 26 24 21 21 23 23 27 27 25
Bs8eage cars 122 117 120 127 153 152 145 140 i24
Rallcar trailers 146 144 141 141 60 60 60 60 60
Other 33 40 42 44 59 60 74 61 56
Available (no.) 1,515 1,559 1,612 1,610 1,635 1,690 1,810 1,994 1,989
Available (2) 88.5 88.7 89.4 91.2 91.1 91.0 90.8 92.8 92.7
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tage 2
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
in noet Ttota .)(including 15,794 15,964 16,134 15,710 16,205 16,858 16,583 16,339 16,159
privately-ownd care)
Box care 4,993 5,096 5,009 4,790 4,973 5,236 5,151 4,948 4,158
Gondolas 6,380 6,548 6,662 6,579 6,713 7,207 6,870 6,824 6,948
no*t care 1,572 1,416 1,133 1,166 1,148 1,141 1,156 1,127 1,097
Tank cars 2,266 2,379 2,489 2,621 2,687 2,736 2,758 2,817 2,739
Others 583 525 841 554 684 684 648 623 617
Available (no.) 14,358 14,259 14,769 14,627 15,233 15,816 15,485 15,383 15,313
Available (2) 90.9 89.3 91.5 93.1 94.0 93.8 93.4 94.2 94.8
In fleet (privately-auned) 1,422 1,445 1,518 1,542 1,607 1,656 1,700 1,720 1,659
TRAFFIC
Paaesr Trafific
oof-pas ere (Total, ala) 221.0 248.7 301.6 371.0 423.7 430.8 441 443.5 49.4
Seoul ubuRbn (SSMSRS) 82.4 100.1 139.4 195.4 240.7 245.7 268 282 315.7-
other 138.6 148.5 162.2 175.6 183.0 185.1 173 161.5 153.7
Pafs tr-VA (ala) 12,926 14,305 17,099 20,054 20,386 21,640 21,551 21,034 21,688
S8O isubutrb4a (SHRSRS) 1,540 1,865 2*536 3,466 4,300 4,436 4,998 5,196 5,615
Other 11,386 12,440 14,563 16,588 17,086 17,204 16,553 19,838 16,073
Avr Joue Total 56.5 57.5 56.7 54.1 50.5 50.2 48.9 47.4 46.2
ras une) 18.7 18.6 18.2 17.7 17.9 18.0 18.6 18.4 17J8
Other 82.2 83.7 89.8 94.5 93.4 93.0 95.8 98.1 104.6
ireisTraffic
m-~-det ton( 000) -42,758 43,630 47.631 49,654 50,879 49,009 48,800 47,500 50,500
Net ton-km (ala) 9,293 9,728 10,509 10,926 11,081 10,798 10,815 10,892 11,629
Average freight haul 217 223 221 220 218 221 222 229 230.3
Traffic units (ala) 22,219 24,033 27,608 30,980 32,467 32,438 32,366 31,926 33,317
Traf fie Denwla
naseagere ha per route kh ('000) 4,111 4,550 5,442 6,360 6,772 6,903 6,905 6,740 6,958
Freight act ton-in per route ha ('000) 2,956 3,094 3,345 3,465 3,509 3,444 3,465 3,489 3,731
Traffic units per route km ('000) 7,067 7,644 8,787 9,826 10,281 10,347 10,370 10,229 10,689
OPERATIONS
Train-Ku ('000) 51,022 55,393 58,217 61,376 64,103 65,319 67,245 69,193 71,477
Accordins to a of Traia
Passenger M S. rallcai) 31,123 34,807 36,905 39,157 41,553 43,293 45,292 47,632 48,637
Freight 19,899 20,586 21,312 22,219 22,550 22,026 21,953 21,561 22,839
According to types of traction
DieSel locomotive 37,876 41,326 42,780 43,800 45,562 46,465 48,384 50,217 53,232
Electric locomotive 5,336 5,475 6,719 7,443 7,386 7,185 7,038 7,051 7,159
Dieel railcar 4,380 4,662 4,283 4,066 4,055 4,296 4,072 4,190 4,216
Electric railcar 3,361 3,885 4,403 6,062 7,099 7,373 7,736 7,734 6,870
Easina-Ra. excludins Shuntins
Dienel locouotives 39,870 43,324 45,040 45,984 48,789 49,654 51,055 61,251 64,184
Electrie locomotives 6,242 6,509 8,306 9,388 9,442 9,318 9,339 9,279 9,688
Diesel railcare 10,647 11,641 10,563 10,873 10,667 11,890 12,326 12,903 12,972
Electric railcars 20,164 23,307 26,426 36,357 42,107 43,131 55,046 56,754 55,176
Rolling Stock-Ku (ala)
Passenger cars, total 241 265 287 315 340 356 389 408 428
Freight cars, total 385 402 430 444 452 435 430 431 463
Loaded 219 226 245 251 252 245 262 263 281
Eapty Lj 166 176 185 193 200 190 168 168 182
Loaded freight cars fozvarded ('000) 966 972 1,052 1,089 1,102 1,050 1,046 1,012 1,075
Average freight car turnaround time (days) 5.4 5.4 5.1 4.9 5.0 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.76
Average freight car turnaround distance (a) 399 414 409 408 410 414 411 426 436
- 51 PTable 4.7
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
t8lIOU0AE DIDICU0118
Avr4e iio.o passngers per 415 411 463 512 515 300 476 442 446
passenger train
Averngo no. of passengers per 53.6 34.0 59.6 63.7 62.9 60.8 53.4 51.6 50.7
joesengmr car
Freight rafftic
Average no. of fretiht care per
freight tratn 19.3 19.5 20.2 20.0 io.0 19.8 19.6 20.0 20.3
loaded 11.0 11.0 11.5 11.3 11.2 10.9 11.9 12.2 12.3
Ompty /c 8.3 8.5 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.9 7.7 7.8 8.0
Average frgbht tratn load (net tons) 467 472 493 492 491 490 493 505 309.2
Average load per loaded frei8ht car 44.6 44.9 45.3 45.6 46.2 46.7 41.3 41.4 41.4
(net tone)
Staff
Staf fic uaits per employee ('000) 561 612 690 767 808 810 799 790 846.5
8cployeeas per route-k 12.6 12.5 12.7 12.8 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.0 12.6
itolltn St2gh
Avall btlity (1)
Diesel locootives, main lIe 86.7 86.4 86.9 88.2 89.7 89.5 89.4 91.2 89.9
8lectric locomotives 84.8 84.6 85.2 89.9 90.0 90.0 88.9 90.0 84.4
Diesel railcars. aeed units 12.3 79.7 17.0 79.0 82.2 83.7 82.4 8173 89.5
asenger cars. 88.5 88.1 89.4 91.2 91.1 91.0 90.8 92.8 92.7
Freight care 90.9 89.3 91.3 93.1 94.0 93.8 93.4 94.2 94.8
Yearly Distance Covered Per Available Unit
('000 ka)
Diesel main lIne 153 152 157 158 156 151 156 180 193.9
Electric main line locomotives 111 118 120 117 117 115 117 115 127.3
Diesel rallcars 123 119 117 108 110 115 126 117 116.9
leectric railcare 183 204 224 210 201 193 185 185 178.6
P"senger cars 159 170 178 196 210 211 220 205 215.2
Feight cars 26.8 28.2 29.1 30.4 29.7 27.5 28 28 30.2
Passenger-km per available passeer car,
includig rail cars ('000) 7,528 8,071 9,034 10,684 11,018 12.805 9,773 8,124 9,002.0
Net ton-km per available freight car ('000) 647 682 712 747 727 683 698 708 759.0
/a Number of fleet to average of number at beginring and end of yer. Available nuaber ts average number during year.
lb 16 line locomotives transferred to shtnters.
/ Including cabooses.
KOREA
RAILWAY VII (Loan 1836-rn)
Porjeot Completion Report
Consolidated Income State,ent (1977-84)
(mon billion)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Audited Audited Audited Audited Audited Audited Audited Actual
Traffic (traffic units billion) A - 35.50 38.90 42.00 45.20 47.90
B 27.61 30.98 32.50 32.40 32.40 31.90 33.32 35.11
Operating revenue A - 316.20 421.90 506.20 604.90 684.70
B 134.30 166.10 208.40 280.60 356.90 417.30 470.92 524.45
Working cost A - 258.20 321.90 387.00 459.80 520.80
B 119.30 142.80 182.50 253.00 318.50 381.80 418.07 441.68
Depreciation A - 24.90 29.50 34.60 39.90 44.90
B 17.30 20.50 26.10 28.70 43.60 51.30 57.97 64.60
Total operating costs A - 283.10 351.40 421.60 499.70 565.70
B 136.60 163.30 208.60 281.70 362.10 433.10 476.04 506.28
Net operating revenue (loss) A - 33.10 70.50 84.60 105.20 119.00
B -2.30 2.80 -0.20 -1.10 -5.20 -15.80 -5.12 18.17
Net nonoperating revenue (loss) A - 1.30 1.50 1.60 1.80 1.90
B -1.40 -0.70 5.00 9.00 2.40 11.40 5.93 6.00
Interest charges A - 40.60 51.70 64.60 75.90 86.10
B 16.30 23.80 29.70 48.60 60.10 69.90 72.46 76.72
Net income (loss) A - 46.20 20.30 21.60 31.10 34.80
B -20.00 -21.70 -24.90 -40.70 -62.90 -74.30 -71.65 -52.55
Exchange loss (profit) A 3.70 3.60 4.00 4.20 4.10
B
Government subsidy against
operating losses A - 25.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B 21.70 21.40 31.90 5.00 0.00 34.80 35.40 55.50
Book profit (loss) A - 15.90 16.70 17.60 26.90 30.70
B 1.70 -0.30 7.00 -35.70 -62.90 -39.50 -36.25 2.95
Notest Line. A = Appraisal forecasts.
Line B = Audited through 1983; actual for 1984. [t
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IunAZI v2 (Lam 1 )
Cah fl. Sttaenwt (19-84)
1977 1976 19W9 1900 1961 1962 1963 1964
Aited Audited AudLted Au*ted AudLted Auited Adited Aotal
80BR OF 7O0S
Ceah eomtd by UR
age" Operating z'vemn A - 316.20 421.90 596.20 604.90 669.70
a 134.30 166.10 206.40 260.60 356.90 417.30 470.92 524.4
Lea uo*kse a A - 256.20 321.90 3700 459.60 520.803 119.30 142.0 162.50 25.00 31.50 301.80 410.07 441.6
SubtoWal-h enerted tree opeati2a A - 5.00 100.00 119.20 1U410 168.90
a 15.00 23.30 25.90 27-60 36-40 35.50 52.0 62.7
Add lowe a In f*luatatiow A - - _ _ 
8 0.40 _ _ _ _ _ _
poiaio for evee pay A 
-
3 -0.50 3.00 2.40 3.20 3420 4.10 3.17 -
Otheanopeting revenue A 1.30 1.50 1.60 1.80 1.90
I -1-40 -0.70 5.00 0.00 2-40 11-40 5.93 6.0o
Sale at. asneta A - 8.50 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00
3 3.10 2.60 0.90 10.60 10-90 11.70 21.34 -
Total cash genated by 3 A 67.80 110.50 130.60 157-90 18Z-.0
3 16.60 28.20 34.20 41.40 54.90 62.70 03-29 88677Subainies
Goymuoat againt op ng loue A - 280 - - - -
3- 21.70 21 40 31.90 5.00 0.00 34.80 35-40 55.50
Govrnment for InVetment A - 22.20 61.40 48.60 35.20 39.20
a 0.80 0.00 37.80 22.20 22*90 18.00 27.50
other A
a 14.40
Total Subeidiaa A - 48.00 61.40 48680 35.20 39.20
3 22.50 21.40 69.70 27.20 Z.90 52.80 62.90 69.90
rami A - 37.50 57-90 67-40 49-10 60.103 25.00 25-30 41.20 23.70 29.50 Z5.90 19.52 16.27
Local A - 69.60 163.20 122.50 120.00 137.50
3 24.00 35.00 46.20 92.80 92.10 94.00 76.23 113.86
Sale of bads A - _
a 49.60 25.00
Total borroawing A - 107.10 221.10 189.90 169.10 197.60
B 49.00 60-30 6?.40 116.50 121.60 169.30 120.7 130.15
GSnd total sourcas of fnd 
- 222.90 393.00 369.50 32.20 419.60
3 86.10 109-90 191-30 1*.10 199-40 2M.00 266.94 206.e2
Investmet A - 156.70 288-60 248-40 213.90 237.40
3 65.40 59.70 133.10 156.30 136-00 15590 144-44 155.16
Debt Sevice
Interest A - 40.60 51.70 64-60 ".90 66.10
3 16.30 23.60 29.70 48.60 60.10 69.90 72-46 76.72
Repayt A - 29.90 34.40 41.60 56.60 66.70
3 15.00 19.50 20.00 36.40 35.60 42.40 42.69 44.69
Total debt servie A - 70.50 86.10 106.20 132.70 152.60
B 31.30 43-30 49.70 0.00 95.70 112.30 115.34 121.41
Grand total appieation of fUnd A - 227-20 374-70 354-60 346-60 390.20
3 96.70 103.00 162.60 243*30 233.70 266.20 259.76 276.57
Anal variation in workIln capital A 
- -430 18.30 14-90 15-60 29.40
B -8.60 6.90 8.50 -5.20 -34.30 16.80 7.16 12.25
llorki osittl brought fornard A - 0.40 -3.90 14.40 29.30 44.90
3 4.90 -3-70 3.20 11.70 -46.50 -8.60 -64.00 -56.64
lorking capital at end of yer A - -3.90 14.40 29-30 44.90 74.30
J -3.70 3.20 11.70 -46.50 -W.60 -64.00 -%-64 -44.59
lotes Line A. Appraisal formtst.
LIno 3 A udited through 199t3 actual for 1984.
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Table 7.1
KOREA
RAILWAYS VII (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Economic Return on Capacity Increases for Freight Services
Tarffic that would
otherwise divert
To other modes
Capital costs without project /b Net benefit stream
Year (W million) /a (million ton-kmFr (W million) /c
1980 6,319 (6,319)
1981 13,084 (13,084)
1982 12,997 - (12,997)
1983 9,099 365 (1,799)
1984 501 635 12,199
1985-2007 - 850 17,000
Rate of Return is 19%
/a Includes investment (in 1979 prices) in lines, motive power and rolling stock, new
repair facilities, telecommunications and power.
/b This is taken conservatively as two thirdp of the freight traffic increase. The
remaining traffic increase is assumed to be handled by improvement in use of existing
facilities.
/c Difference (in 1979 prices) between transport cost by rail and the least costly alter-
native. This is generally road transport since coastal shipping is only competitive
for traffic with origins and destinations at or near ports and this has already been
taken into account when forecasting railway traffic. An average of W 20 per ton-km is
assumed as the cost difference. This assumes a terminal cost for rail operations of
W 1,200 per ton, and a road cost which is a weighted average of heavy truck costs on
paved and gravel roads (3/4 paved and 1/4 gravel).
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Table 7.2
KOREA
RAILWAYS VII (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Financial Return on Capacity Increases for Passenger Services
Passenger increase Operating Profits /b
Capital Limited express Limited express
Cost /a AC non-AC AC non-AC
Year (W milllon) (million pass.-km) (Won million) Total
1980 11,049 - - - (11,049)
1981 19,553 - - - - (19,553)
1982 14,938 170 191 1,190 764 (12,984)
1983 11,037 545 887 3,815 3,548 (3,674)
1984 1,244 1,030 1,154 7,210 4,616 10,582
1985-2007 - 1,200 1,300 8,400 5,200 13,600
Rate of return is 14%
/a Includes investments in lines, motive power and rolling stock, new repair
facilities, telecommunications and power.
/b Difference between total operating costs and revenues, i.e.,
Special express...................*.....9 Won/pass.-km
Limited express, air conditioned ....... 7 Won/pass.-km
Limited express, non air conditioned... 4 Won/pass.-km
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Table 7.3
KOREA
RAILWAYS VII (LOAN 1836-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Economic Return on Capacity Increases for Seoul Surburban Services
Traffic that would Economic cost
Capital costs /a divert to buses savings from
Line Railcars Total without project alternative mode /b
Year (W million) (million pass.-km) (W billion)
1978 3,516 _ 3,516 - -
1979 8,254 - 8,254 - -
1980 13,599 19,333 32,932 - -
1981 4,528 - 4,528 - -
1982 2,104 - 2,104 - -
1983 241 - 241 - -
1984 - 2,250 2,250 1,000 3.75
1985 - - - 2,000 12.00
1986-2007 - - - 2,685 16.10
Rate of return is 16%
/a Includes investment for the entire quadrupling of the Seoul-Suweon line,
started under the sixth project and completed under this project, and the
electric railcars acquired.
/b Difference between cost by rail and cost by bus. This is conservative as,
without the project, some trips may divert to taxis and cars at higher
costs. Cost by urban buses in Seoul were some W 10/passenger-km while
costs by SMESRS were W 4/passenger-km.
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